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 ABSTRACT 
While the 2008 financial crisis has come and gone, its effects on the global financial sector still 
show. Globalisation has since changed the way that banks do business, and increased 
competitiveness and with it the level of risk within the international banking community. 
Therefore, because of these prolonged effects of the financial crisis and the rise in the level of 
risk in banking, regulators deemed it fit to make the global financial sector safer and sounder. As 
a result, the BASEL III Capital Accord was introduced with tighter capital adequacy and liquidity 
ratio requirements; as well as also introducing the leverage ratio. In this paper, through the study 
of the rules and regulations on banks in South Africa, Brazil and China, it was discovered that all 
three countries have since begun the implementation of the new Accord as from January 2013. 
While preparatory measures may be different, there is a general sense of regulatory alignment 
among the three countries. By analysing the capital adequacy, liquidity and leverage ratios of the 
three countries, it was also established that these ratios are interconnected, with the capital 
adequacy ratio being the most important one. The study concludes that, with proper 
implementation of these ratios and effective management, countries implementing the BASEL 
III regulations would be in a stronger position to achieve soundness in their banking systems. 
Keywords: Capital adequacy ratio, leverage ratio, liquidity ratio, regulatory alignment, BASEL III 
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 CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
A financial system lies at the “heart” of an economy and thus, the success of policy making and 
the effectiveness of the central bank in controlling the variables of an economy depend on the 
soundness of the financial system (Kapoor, 2010: 6). Most individual enterprises lack enough 
capital for large investment which is important for firms to take advantage of increasing returns 
to scale. Therefore, the financial system, which is made up of mostly banks and other financial 
intermediaries, acts as a source of capital for most of these firms (Stiglitz, 1998: 1). The role of 
the financial system is, as noted by Boot and Thakor (1997), to act as an intermediary through 
the transfer of funds from surplus to deficit units. 
Much of the literature emphasises the importance of the link between the financial system and 
the economy as a whole, and notes the importance of a well-managed system so as to allocate 
resources efficiently. Duisenberg (2001: 2) emphasises this role in that the financial system 
“provides (for) the continuous restructuring of the economy that is needed to support growth.” 
Banks have become the major players of the financial system as they are at the centre of the 
funds transfer process (Allen and Carletti, 2008). They have, however, also become the major 
reason why many financial systems fail; and Claessens and Kose (2013: 18) argue that “banks are 
inherently fragile, making them vulnerable to runs by depositors” and so the fall of a major bank 
may lead to the collapse of the whole system. The volatile nature of the banking sector, and the 
other intermediaries that make up the overall financial system, therefore make the system 
potentially volatile and susceptible to shocks. Thus, an inefficient financial system causes crises.  
History shows that banks were in the centre of most of the financial crises that occurred prior to 
the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 (Foster and Magoff, 2009: 45), the worst of which was the 
Great Depression of the 1930s. Although bank regulation had been in force for decades, it was 
not as tight as it should have been. According to Larson (2011:5), regulation seemed to be 
subjective, with countries left to do what they deemed fit for their financial systems. However, 
with the rise of globalisation, this subjective view to regulation changed as the failure of one 
financial system meant many more would also fail. This was mainly shown by the fall of some 
major banks in Europe in 1974 which affected the international financial market as a whole; thus 
banking and financial regulation had to become a necessity rather than an option and be 
implemented at an international level.  
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 The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), through its Basel Committee for Bank Supervision 
(BCBS), has been a major player in the regulation of banks since 1974. The BASEL Committee 
proposed the first set of banking regulations in 1988, called BASEL I (also known as the Basel 
Capital Accord) following the fall of the Bretton Woods system in 1973 which resulted in the 
fluctuation of exchange rates. The main focus was on capital adequacy and the Committee called 
for a high capital to asset ratio of 8% (BCBS, 2013: 2). BASEL I also focused on credit risk, with 
an amendment to the Capital Accord being made in 1995. To emphasise the importance of good 
quality capital for banks and the financial system, the Committee proposed a new set of 
regulation guidelines in 1999, i.e. the BASEL II Accord. BASEL II was meant as a major 
improvement to BASEL I and also to act as an encouragement for banks to continue to manage 
risk better (BCBS, 2013: 3). Prior to the fall of Lehman Brothers, which marked the onset of the 
financial crisis in the United States in 2008, the Committee realised how vulnerable the banks 
were as a result of high leverage ratios, low capital adequacy ratios and low liquidity ratios; 
therefore they proposed the “Principles for sound liquidity risk management and supervision” 
which became known as BASEL 2.5, as it strengthened the BASEL II Accord (BCBS, 2013:4). 
The final attempt by the Committee to avert a financial crisis (at the end of 2007), was to no 
avail as the crisis hit the global market beginning of 2008. The crisis started in the United States 
and, as was the case in the earlier crises, the banks were blamed. With very high leverage ratios 
and a growing number of unsecured loans, under a very low interest rate policy, the banks 
created a credit boom. Claessens and Kose (2013: 9) argue that the rapidly increasing house 
prices and the stagnant salaries created the need for credit by the public which gave banks the 
opportunity to increase their profitability. To attract more clients, banks began issuing poorly 
secured or unsecured loans leading to a series of loan defaults; accompanied by the low capital 
levels and high leverage ratios. This resulted in the demise of some banks, with Lehman Brothers 
being the first major bank to declare bankruptcy. This was followed by a series of government 
bailouts and the subsequent European Sovereign Debt Crisis which was also contributed to by 
the financial meltdown (Edmomdset.al, 2010: 6). The financial crisis thus pointed out the fact 
that regulation was still inadequate and that risk in the system was still very high. Should the 
banks have had enough capital and proper risk management tools when the crisis emerged, most 
of them would have avoided bankruptcy. The BASEL Committee accordingly proposed a new 
set of banking regulations known as BASEL III in 2010. The focus was again on capital 
adequacy, the quality of capital and risk management for banks but, liquidity and leverage ratios 
were thus introduced, and these ratios will be the cornerstone of the investigation of the 
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 soundness of the financial system in this research. Therefore it is essential to define these 
concepts in detail.  
The capital adequacy ratio measures bank capital in relation to risk exposure and assets. For a 
bank to stay solvent and avoid the risk of a declining value of assets, therefore keeping it and the 
system efficient, it has to be positively capitalised, with the  value of its capital exceeding its 
liabilities; hence under BASEL III, capital adequacy ratios were upgraded (BCBS, 2013: 4). 
Larson (2011) states, since banks make loans by accepting deposits, which are liabilities, a high 
capital base would protect the bank in the case of a bank run. In 2008, as result of low capital 
bases, many banks failed to honour their liabilities and therefore collapsed; the importance of 
capital cannot be emphasised enough. Not only was the level of capital increased, but the quality 
of capital was also redefined under the new Accord to ensure that the capital buffer the banks 
have is strong enough. 
The focus of BASEL III also lies on bank leverage; i.e. the extent to which a bank finances its 
assets through debt rather than equity since the former is a cheaper source of finance. However, 
while high leverage can lead to higher profits for banks, it can lead to increased losses and erode 
a bank’s capital during unfavourable conditions, as was the case with the 2008 crisis. A situation 
of high leverage also requires that the assets generate returns sufficient to cover the cost of debt 
finance. If the return falls, which may be the case in times of financial stress, high leverage 
becomes problematic (BCBS, 2014: 1).  The problem would be initiated with banks continuously 
making bad and / or unsecured loans and ultimately a bank run would lead to insolvencies 
(D’Hustler, 2009: 1). High leverage is regarded as being a major contributor to the 2008 crisis, 
and the BASEL Committee accordingly proposed a “non-risk based leverage ratio to supplement 
the risk based capital framework of BASEL II”. The leverage ratio is measured by dividing the 
bank’s capital by its total exposure (BIS, 2012: 32).  
Liquidity, which is the ease with which a bank can convert its assets into cash, is also a major 
focus of the new accord. BASEL III covers two liquidity ratios; the Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
(LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). The LCR requires banks to hold high quality 
liquid assets. Since banks are in the business of making loans which make up part of their assets, 
loan defaults would mean they are no longer liquid, therefore high quality liquid assets would 
prevent bank failure in times of financial stress (Bouwman, 2013: 1). The liquidity ratio is given 
by the ratio of high quality liquid assets to total net liquidity outflows (BIS, 2012: 37). As 
mentioned before, the BASEL Committee did not only advocate for more capital but also for 
good quality capital; to ensure that banks always have high quality and more stable bases of 
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 funding or capital. According to BIS (2012), the NSFR should also at all times exceed 100%. It is 
important to note that even with enough capital, some banks still failed during the 2008 crisis, 
because they had low liquidity, demonstrating the importance of liquidity as a supplementary tool 
in avoiding bank failures (Sheng, 2013). 
While much has been written on the 2008 global financial crisis and its effects on the United 
States and Europe, there is still a need for research on the countries which had, unlike the USA, 
implemented BASEL II and III and whether or not this contributed to their avoiding the 
immediate (financial) effects of the crisis. Of interest is a comparison between South Africa and 
the two BRICS countries selected for this study, namely China and Brazil, since fairly similar 
BASEL II and III implementations were followed. The trade and banking relationships shared 
by these countries make it essential to have compatible regulatory systems in place. 
1.2 IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
The role of banks within a financial system has grown over the years and so has their 
contribution, whether positive or negative. With this there has been the need to regulate and 
monitor how banks operate. It also brings up the issue of risk management and hence the 
evolution of the BASEL Accords. However, even with these regulations in place, many banks 
collapsed during the financial crisis. This may be attributed to some flaws in the regulatory policy 
(Cao, 2012:180) and also the lack of efficient risk management tools. Risk management has been 
made a requirement for banks as they are required to have a set of risk management tools as part 
of the regulatory requirements that are put forward for them. The core of risk management 
under the BASEL Accords has always been that of capital adequacy, as by imposing a capital 
buffer requirement, regulators ensure that banks can “make their risks sustainable” (Bessis, 
2010:9). As it was evident towards the 2008 crisis that regulatory agencies failed to notice and 
therefore avert disaster, risk management tools are very important to avoid the recurrence of 
such a situation.  
There has been a noticeable increase in the growth of activity in the financial sectors of the 
developing countries, especially after the crisis. This therefore shows how banks in these 
countries are also growing, thus motivating the need for better risk management tools for these 
banks. This also provides a better justification for the need to analyse the viability of the leverage 
and the liquidity ratios (which are part and parcel of capital adequacy) as banking risk 
measurements within the BRICS countries. It is no secret that the high bank leverage and very 
low liquidity ratios contributed highly to the collapse of most banks during the crisis. This 
therefore raises the fact that these ratios can be good indicators of bank risk and so measures can 
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 be taken to avoid disaster. Although there are a lot of risk management tools that have been 
proposed over the years, there has not been much exploration on the effectiveness of these 
ratios as warnings; thus a reason for this study.  
This study involves three of the BRICS countries as they seem to be at roughly the same level of 
regulatory policies, with regard to implementing the BASEL III. As mentioned above, the 
economic relationships that these countries have make it essential to have a uniform regulatory 
system. The choice of the countries also stems from the fact that they are developing countries 
and their level of bank and financial activity has been growing, making them very much 
vulnerable to high risk.  
1.3 GOALS OF THE RESEARCH 
The first goal of the research will be to investigate the implementation of BASEL II and BASEL 
III in South Africa, China and Brazil in order to establish the extent of financial policy alignment 
between them. This is essential to avoid the possibilities of bank arbitrage (which will be 
discussed in detail under the weaknesses of BASEL II) and contagion.  
Secondly, the research will analyse the financial soundness of the three countries by examining 
their capital adequacy, leverage and liquidity ratios, comparatively; over a period of eight years 
before and five years after the 2008 financial crisis (2000-2013). This is essential to draw a 
conclusion on their BASEL II implementation, as well as their planning for BASEL III. 
1.4 METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
Publications regarding the implementation of BASEL II and III in the three countries will be 
used to examine regulatory policy alignment as well as the soundness of the banking systems of 
the three countries prior to and after the crisis. Research papers and reports on the BASEL 
Accords will also be analysed so as to bring out the successes and failures of the Accords over 
the period 2000-2013.  
The data to construct the three ratios for the three countries will be collected for comparative 
and descriptive analysis to draw conclusions on the financial soundness of each country as the 
BASEL Accords include these ratios as part of regulatory standards. The analysis will be 
instrumental to determine whether the adoption of these ratios has influenced bank risk in any 
way at a national level over the selected time period. Statistical data for the capital adequacy, 
leverage and liquidity ratios for the three countries will be obtained from Bankscope, an 
international banks’ electronic database, while additional information on regulation and 
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 implementation of the BASEL Accords will be sourced from the Central Banks of the countries 
and the Bank of International Settlements. 
1.5 ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY 
To fully understand the full evolution and implementation of the BASEL Capital Accords, the 
rest of the study is arranged as follows: Chapter 2 gives a general overview of the history of 
regulation as well as the history of all the three BASEL Accords. This includes the reasons for 
the transitions from BASEL I to BASEL II and from BASEL II to BASEL III. Chapter 3 deals 
with the planning, implementation and timeline of the BASEL III Accord in South Africa, Brazil 
and China. This chapter will show, in detail, how each of the three countries has prepared for the 
implementation of the new Accord and will also discuss how the Accord will be introduced in 
each country. Chapter 4 analyses and compare the capital adequacy ratio, leverage ratio and 
liquidity ratio for the three countries. Finally, Chapter 5 discusses the major findings, conclusions 
and recommendations.  
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 CHAPTER 2 
OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF BANKING SUPERVISION AND 
REGULATION: BASEL I, II AND III 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Banks being the major role-players in the financial system has raised an awareness of the dangers 
they pose when it comes to financial crises. This has created the need for tighter regulation 
which is key in trying to avoid crises. However, despite all regulatory standards proposed, 
banking risks still exist. It is therefore important to understand the role the banks play in the 
financial system, the history of financial crises and bank regulation so as to explore the 
theoretical foundations and evolution of the capital adequacy, leverage and liquidity ratios. 
2.2 HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 
Literature has shown that the financial sector is an important contributor to economic 
development. Honohan and Laeven (2005) say that the lack of efficient financial systems is one 
of the reasons that poverty is always high and economic growth is sometimes low. However, it is 
also important to keep in mind that most of the financial systems around the world are also very 
fragile and are plagued by crises and these have been marked as the “unmeasured costs of 
banking crises” (Honohan and Laeven, 2005). Banks have been associated with financial crises to 
the extent that Bordo and Landon-Lane (2010) define financial crises as “banking crises that are 
aggravated by debt and/ or currency crises.” This shows how much banks contribute in creating 
these crises and how much they need to be regulated.  
According to Bordo and Landon-Lane (2010:7), the crisis of 1914 was the last major crisis before 
the World War I broke out and this marked the beginning of major capital controls. Although 
these controls helped to avert crises in many countries, the post war period (1919-1939) brought 
new problems as there were two major periods of bank failures leading to major recessions.  
Financial crises during inter World War I-II period happened within a state of complete 
globalisation during which many economies were under the Gold Standard, which meant that 
exchange rates were fixed. This period is also well known for the Great Depression of 1929-33 
which was a consequence of the stock market collapse of 1929.  
As mentioned before, there were two major periods of bank failures that led to recessions. The 
first was the period 1920-1925 which marked a series of bank failures across Europe, Asia and 
Mexico. Major European banks failed because of the hyper-inflation that had been caused by the 
aftermath of the war. Many countries tried to revert back to the Gold Exchange Standard in an 
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 effort to stabilise their economies to no avail. The next major period of bank failures was 1929-
1934 which has become the worst period in financial crises history. The stock market crashes in 
the United States and the United Kingdom in 1929 marked the beginning of the Great 
Depression. This was made worse by many unpredictable bank panics that occurred in 1930 in 
the US. These bank panics could not be predicted and even occurred under the fixed exchange 
rate regime. The bank panics came to an end after many adopted the Bretton Woods system. 
The Bretton Woods has been credited for the crisis-free period that followed World War II, but 
as soon as it was abandoned in the 1970s, banking crises emerged again. The 20th century has 
been branded the era of banking crises which plagued the world throughout the 1980s and 
worsened during the 1990s (Bordo andLandon-Lane, 2010). According to Bexley et.al (2010), it is 
during the 20th century that over 1600 banks failed. 
According to Bordo and Landon-Lane (2010), in the period 1990-2000 there were three major 
crises: the European banking and currency crisis, the Mexican banking crisis of 1994 and the 
Asian banking and currency crisis of 1997. In all of these, bank failures were present which 
supports the definition of a financial crisis which includes a bank crisis. The most recent financial 
failure is the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. According to Gup (2010), this was a crisis that had 
many causes ranging from the trading of high risk securities, the collapse of the housing market, 
poor bank balance sheets and business models, excessive leveraging, liquidity problems, to 
mention but a few. It has also been observed that these causes reflect greediness and poor 
regulation of the banking industry.  
2.3 THE ROLE OF BANKS IN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
Banks have a part to play in the evolution and magnification of financial crises but they also have 
a part to play in the development of the financial system. The financial system is crucial to the 
economy because it plays a significant role in the provision and routing of short and long term 
funds for investment purposes. This directly feeds into the economy as investment is the main 
driver of economic growth. Thus, it has become evident over time that although there are many 
players within the financial system, banks do play the most important role as they transform 
savings into long term financing (OECD, 2013). Provision of funds and information are some of 
the many roles that banks play in the financial system. 
In the event that the system fails and collapses, it would not only become difficult to trade 
securities but the cost of capital would rise significantly (OECD, 2013). This shows the extent to 
which banks are important in the day to day activities of the financial sector. However, as a result 
of the volatility of the assets they trade and hold and the lack of balance between these assets and 
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 their liabilities, banks become more vulnerable to runs and possible risk (Allen and Carletti, 
2008). This brings to the fore the challenges that arise as a result of the banking system being the 
heart of a financial system. Banks have proven that they can cause a financial system to collapse - 
as has been evident since the Great Depression of 1929-1933; thus they have to be monitored 
constantly.  
Before looking into the concept of regulation, it is important to focus briefly on the financial 
crises and how banks have contributed to them; for it is because of such events that bank 
regulation became a necessity. The next section presents an insight into the financial crises from 
the World War I-II period to the 2008 financial crisis. 
2.4THE ROLE BANKS PLAY IN FINANCIAL CRISES 
Banks were once viewed as the foundation of the economy, as they were safe efficient and 
reliable, while providing the capital means by which an economy would flourish and prosper. 
However, as much as banks contribute deeply to economic development, they are also 
responsible for the creation or aggravation of financial crises through bank panics. Banks are 
major risk takers and over the years developed ways to manage risks (Posner, 2009). Banks make 
their profits out of deposits which they use to grant loans and depositors have the right to claim 
their money and therefore can withdraw these deposits anytime. 
When banks are funded largely on borrowed funds their loans outstrip their capital, making them 
susceptible to runs and subsequently bankruptcy if the loans are defaulted upon. Therefore, since 
banks provide long term loans while giving depositors instant access to their savings, they 
become vulnerable to imbalances in their books, thus incurring a liquidity risk (Posner, 
2009).There are many other causes of financial crises that have been identified over the decades 
and, bank panics are the most significant. Mishkin (1997) also mentioned that apart from 
liquidity risk, bank panics also originate from information asymmetry. Depositors panic over the 
wellness of a bank and rush to make withdrawals (bank runs). If bank runs occur and a bank 
does not have enough capital to protect itself, it faces bankruptcy. Mishkin (1997) emphasises 
that bank panics result in the “increase of adverse selection and agency problems in the financial 
market” which can lead to a financial crisis. This causes a rise in the interest rates and the 
subsequent contraction of an economy.  
Over the years, risk trading has become increasingly popular with the banks. Risk trading under 
poor to no regulatory supervision is another way that banks have created financial crises. This 
happened just before the 2008 financial crisis and was triggered by the fall in interest rates which 
increased the demand for credit or loans (Posner, 2009). With the increase in the demand for 
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 loans, banks took less care in vetting borrowers and started granting bad loans. This was 
worsened by the loose regulatory restrictions on banks’ risky lending. One of the biggest risks 
that a bank could face is default risk and since banks are funded largely on deposits that can be 
taken back at any time, in the case of loan defaults, a bank will be left less liquid and vulnerable 
to panics. 
With the increase in the amount of money in circulation, because of the loans, there was an 
increase in buying and building houses, which contributed to a housing bubble. Posner (2009:47) 
raises the point that the low interest rates are attractive not only to the borrower but the lender 
as well. The lender (banks) can utilise the situation to increase their leverage and thus increase 
profits. Therefore, they in turn choose to increase the amount of deposits they take in 
(borrowing) rather than increasing their capital base. However, if by any chance the banks make 
even a small loss on the loans they give out (defaults may occur as well) then this would leave the 
bank vulnerable to bankruptcy through a panic. 
During the housing bubble of 2007, banks started to raise their capital by issuing securities that 
were backed by the mortgage loans that they had been granted. Such risk taking is the reason 
why banks contributed heavily to the financial crisis, because when the mortgage loans were 
defaulted, they were left with no capital to cover them when the bubble burst and it created a 
panic(Posner, 2009:49). Therefore, high leverage, coupled by low liquidity (being financed 
through borrowings and making long term mortgage loans, left the banks with illiquid assets) 
and high risk trading became some of the major reasons for the banking crisis that caused the 
2008 financial crisis. 
Regulation of the financial sector has been loose since the 1980s, and this together with banks’ 
risky behaviour discussed above, have led to advocating for the need for tight regulation on 
banks and the financial sector. 
2.5 REGULATION OF BANKS 
Financial crises have existed alongside banks for a long time and thus monitoring of these 
institutions has since become a major goal. Regulation in general has not always been as strict as 
it is today, as Larson (2011:5) notes that countries were left to implement regulatory measures as 
they deemed fit for their financial systems. However, with the rise of globalisation and the rise in 
major risk trading by banks, this subjective view to regulation changed as the failure of one 
financial system meant many more would also fail. This was mainly shown by the fall of some 
major banks in Europe in 1974 which affected the international financial market as a whole. This 
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 meant that banking and financial regulation became a necessity rather than an option and had to 
be at an international level.  
Banking systems started to really grow and show their potential towards the end of the 20th 
century, around the 1980s. It has been argued that as much as it was a bad idea, deregulation of 
the banking and the financial systems in many countries following the United States from the 
1970s to the early 1980s is one of the reasons why the banking system grew. Sprong (2000) 
argues that the idea behind deregulation was that with fewer regulations, which acted as barriers 
to entry for many smaller banks, there would be more productivity and industry effectiveness as 
more competition would have been introduced. As much as this worked to some extent, it also 
proved to be disastrous, as the 20th century is the period that some of the major banking and 
financial crises started. Sprong (2000:30) also states that during this period, over 1000 banks in 
the United States alone failed or were about to fail and needed the assistance of the government.  
This is also the period in which regulation of the banks began. 
Banks had grown so much that the risk they posed to global economic development was too 
great. With deregulation, banks were allowed to trade in securities that were volatile in nature and 
which left them with no liquidity buffer in case of runs occurring. Deregulation was therefore 
phased out towards the end of the 1980s and this is also the time that the Bank of International 
Settlements, through the BASEL Committee proposed a set of regulations that banks had to 
follow (BASEL I), which was in 1988. Other sets of regulations were to follow as the first one 
did not prevent the crisis that occurred in the early 1990s.  
2.5.1 BASEL I 
The 20th century became part of the history of bank and financial crises, with the 1974 stock 
market crash and the 1982 Chilean crisis that saw many banks fail and many more being bailed 
out, which almost resulted in government defaults. This and many more scares called for a 
tighter grip on banks and the United States raised the need for an international standard capital 
requirement for banks. Therefore, the BASEL Committee which had been working on this issue 
for many years were brought in to help (Goodhart, 2011:5).The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision had been formed in 1974 but it was not until 1988 that the Committee proposed 
their first set of regulations that banks had to follow, i.e. the BASEL I Accord.  
The BASEL I Accord had a set of regulations that were not legally binding but were mere 
suggestions on how banks could operate and avoid failures. As it had been in the 1970s to early 
1980s, the need for banks to hold more capital was still the major focus of the Committee. The 
fear was that many international banks were taking lightly the need for holding high levels of 
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 capital by engaging in risky activities which left them with more liabilities than their assets and 
therefore left them susceptible to shocks. With this in mind, the Committee proposed that by 
1992, all banks should have a minimum capital adequacy ratio of 8% (BIS, 2013).This ratio 
represented the back up on the banks’ assets, and Jablecki (2009) states that this 
recommendation was developed with a view to improving risk management. This would ensure 
that in the case of a shock to the financial or the banking system, the banks would be able to 
withstand the shock and avoid bankruptcy. This therefore set up the foundation for strict 
banking regulation and the Accord was slowly implemented by many countries around the 
world. 
However, there was a flaw in the BASEL I Accord as the capital requirement proposal the 
Committee had recommended the banks to follow meant that banks could manipulate it so as to 
engage in arbitrage activities and thus raise their leverage levels which later proved to be 
disastrous (Jablecki, 2009:19). This therefore prompted the banks to begin trading risky securities 
so as to manipulate their capital structure, thus opening up doors to what Dowd et.al (2011) 
called “the securitization bonanza of the last two decades”. Thus, the Capital Accord is often 
blamed for this and is regarded as one of the weaknesses of this Accord. The other problem that 
the Committee did not take into account beside the hedging strategies that banks had at their 
disposal, was the different setting of the economies globally. The Accord was adopted on a “one 
size fits all” approach which obviously would not work. Balin (2008) states that the Accord was 
not initially meant to be implemented in developing countries but with the pressure from 
international trading partners, the Accord was tried out in the emerging markets and was not 
successful. The move to an improved regulatory framework was imminent especially because of 
the banking crisis of the 1990s which came at the end of the 20th century.  
2.5.2BASEL II 
Proposed in 1999, the new capital framework later known as the BASEL II Accord was 
implemented in 2004. Although BASEL II maintained the capital framework of the previous 
Accord, it mainly focused on minimising the risk that the banks were creating through 
securitisation. Therefore, the Committee added more kinds of risks banks had to consider, which 
included credit risk, market risk and even operational risk; with operational risk being included in 
the 8% capital requirement as well (Hussain et.al, 2012:151). This new Accord, designed to be 
implemented over some time, was meant to be more risk sensitive and also took into account the 
different financial systems of individual countries, which the first Accord had missed. The 
Committee also gave the regulators in the different countries the freedom to choose a method to 
calculate capital adequacy while adopting the best risk management policies that would best fit 
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 their systems so as to ensure the effectiveness of the Accord in reducing banking risk.The 
Accord had three pillars, namely the Minimum Capital Requirement, Supervisory Review Process 
and Market Discipline. The first pillar was meant to strengthen BASEL I while the other two 
pillars were meant to add more value to the innovation of risk and capital management (BIS, 
2004).  
  
The first pillar was the Minimum Capital Requirement (also known as the solvency ratio)and 
dealt with the calculation of the capital requirement and regulatory capital, now also included 
operational risk and not just credit risk alone as in the first Accord. The new Accord still 
prioritised capital as the most important control ratio because capital is the main buffer that 
prevents the banks from making losses or going bankrupt (Balthazar, 2006).According to CML 
(2013), the addition of the other types of risk in the new Accord was meant to ensure that 
lenders seriously consider a culture of risk management in their organisation up to the highest 
managerial level. The Committee proposed two complex ways of calculating credit risk and these 
were the standardized approach and the internal rating based (IRB) approaches which were 
meant to act as incentives for banks to be able to choose the best innovative way of risk 
managing.  
   
The second pillar, the Supervisory Review Process mainly dealt with the internal controls of the 
banks, that is to say how they operated. The Accord required the banks to have interior 
structures that would incorporate the levels of the capital requirements and the risk profiles that 
the Committee had set up. The internal system of the banks also needed to be innovative so as 
to incorporate some types of risks that were not laid out by the Committee in the Accord 
(Balthazar, 2006:46). According to BIS (2004), as soon as the bank supervisors are done 
evaluating the bank’s internal structure, they should then decide whether it is necessary for the 
bank to hold more capital which is above the required 8%; thus making this pillar very flexible. 
However, these supervisions were subject to external review or intervention where necessary. 
 
The last pillar, Market Discipline, was about transparency and disclosure. This required banks to 
report their internal risk and capital management processes and these would later be published 
regularly to the benefit of the public (market). This level of transparency would give the 
consumers better insight into the banks before doing business with them. This would also allow 
them to reward the banks whose books were in order by doing business with them and, by doing 
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 so, giving the banks a bigger incentive to incorporate better risk profiles that would better attract 
customers (Balthazar, 2006). 
 
BASEL II was originally designed for the active banks but proved to be implementable on other 
banks as well. This new Accord was also flexible and not only allowed banks to adopt systems 
that they felt comfortable with but also allowed them to be innovative in choosing the best risk 
profiles. With the addition of operational risk and the second and third pillars, risk management 
became the main focus, thus providing a promising future for the banks internationally. Another 
benefit that the Accord brought was that of transparency which improved the need for banks to 
adopt more efficient risk profiles so as to attract more customers (Makwiramiti, 2008). This 
meant that risky trading had been minimised and therefore the chances of banks failing because 
of risk trading had also been minimised.  
 
However, with these and more benefits that the BASEL II Accord introduced, one of the 
biggest financial crisis ever experienced still found its way into the world financial system in 
2008, and the banks bore much of the blame. This therefore brought about concerns about this 
Accord and if its main objective of minimising banking risk had been achieved. Thus, the failings 
of BASEL II prompted the need for BASEL III. 
 
2.5.3 Shortcomings of BASEL II  
 
BASEL II was an improvement from the first Accord of 1988 and had many benefits, some of 
which were briefly mentioned in the previous section. However, despite the improvements, in 
2008 the world was brought to its knees by the global financial crisis. What critics were quick to 
point out as a weakness in the structure of BASEL II was the amount of freedom that the banks 
were given. As mentioned before, the Accord gave the banks the ability to choose the best 
methods of calculating risk and it also gave them the leeway to be innovative. According to 
Balthazar (2006:46), as much as this may have been beneficial, so much flexibility would give the 
regulators “too much subjectivity, which could undermine the level playing field objective”. 
Many regulators have discovered that as much as it is beneficial to give banks the liberty to make 
their own risk modelling it also makes it very difficult to distinguish between the high from the 
low risk banks. Therefore, regulators found it difficult when it came to figuring out who had 
high or low leverage ratios before the crisis. Thus, although flexibility was devised with the best 
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 intentions, it proved to be a deciding factor in failing to prevent the crisis because identifying 
high risk from low risk banks is very important.  
 
The BASEL II Accord has been criticised for making banks function in a more pro-cyclical 
manner which resulted in the amplification of economic recessions (Balin, 2008). As Dowd et.al 
(2011:22)argue, “capital requirements should be anti-cyclical” and the pro-cyclical nature created 
by the Accord resulted in the illusion that when an economy is booming, the market is less risky; 
therefore investors could engage in more trading that may also be more risky. The rise in the 
need for investment also elevates the need to borrow and so lending by banks also increase. With 
the rise in lending, the risks that the banks carry become high as they tend to have high leverage 
as well. Banks would also need less capital to recover risks when the economy is booming; 
therefore they become careless and keep less capital to the extent that when the economy goes 
into a downturn, they do not have enough capital to cover losses as it is during the downturn 
that most loan defaults occur (Hussain et.al, 2012). On the contrary, the Accord should have 
been able to prevent a situation where the financial system becomes unstable, especially when 
the market fails (a market crash) but with the creation of a pro-cyclical environment this would 
not be likely. In addition to the pro-cyclical problem, the Accord also caused systematic volatility; 
that is it made contagion worse. The fall of one bank meant that the whole system would be 
affected because all banks were following the same BASEL principles. This would be made 
worse under poor risk and poor regulatory management.  
  
Another criticism of the BASEL II Accord was its over-reliance on rating agencies to assess the 
risk of market participants which caused problems for the banks and the whole system. Since not 
every firm or market participant could afford the services of the rating agencies, this created a 
huge information asymmetry problem. The lack of such crucial information resulted in banks 
issuing bad loans which exposed the banks to shocks (Balin, 2008:15). The other problem which 
reliance on the agencies created was the competition they created amongst themselves for clients. 
This rival resulted in most of them allegedly taking bribes to falsify ratings when investors would 
have preferred honest ratings; thus the information available for the banks was biased (Dowd 
et.al,2011:20). This problem was also exacerbated by the fact that the banks and the corporations 
could choose the agency they wanted to rate them, leading to lack of objectivity. 
 
BASEL III did not fix the problem of “regulatory arbitrage” (Dowd et.al, 2011). Just like its 
predecessor, it was also an open book and was vulnerable to manipulation by the financial 
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 institutions. Banks would use the rules of the Accord to their advantage so as to make short term 
profits. This meant low capital ratios, low liquidity and very high leverage in the banks’ books 
leaving them vulnerable to shocks. Regulatory arbitrage is the reason there has been a high 
growth in securitisation and high risk securities’ trading. Securitisation has a very high risk of 
failing as very low quality and recycled assets which carry a high risk of default are used as 
capital. This leaves the bank vulnerable to shocks. Furthermore, securitisation puts risk in one 
place rather than distributing it.  
 
The other major disappointment of the BASEL II Accord was its failure to cater for the 
emerging markets. It was tailor made for the developed G10 countries and not the emerging 
markets and despite the fact that the BASEL Committee made some extra principles that would 
only fit the emerging economies, this did not give any relief to these markets since the world only 
recognised the BASEL principles as the appropriate regulatory standards, therefore, business 
preference would only go to those that were implementing the BASEL II principles. This left the 
emerging communities with no choice but to implement these principles as well and, as a result 
of the effects of globalisation (contagion), many of the emerging markets also felt the effects of 
the crisis. Since the Accord heavily relied on the rating agencies, the business of the banks would 
thus be dependent on the level of rating the agencies gave them. Since these agencies are 
expensive many small banks in the emerging markets could not be rated, thus worsening the 
contagion situation (Balin, 2008).  
 
Therefore, as a result of all these and other shortcomings of the BASEL II Accord, there was a 
need for new and revised regulatory principles. This brought about the introduction of the 
BASEL III Accord which was meant to be more efficient than the previous two Accords. 
However, some literature suggests that the failure of BASEL II cannot be entirely blamed for the 
outbreak of the financial crisis, especially since the crisis started in the United States which had 
not been implementing the Accord. However, BASEL II escalated the problem especially for 
those countries that had implemented it as it failed to protect them from the effects of the crisis 
as had been expected. 
2.5.4 BASEL III 
As indicated above, BASEL II seemingly failed in its quest of making the banking system risk 
free and ironically gave banks the freedom for innovative ideas to make more short term profits, 
which consequently rendered the system even worse. The very high leverage ratios, the 
inexplicably low capital and liquidity ratios within the banks’ books left them vulnerable to 
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 shocks and bank runs. This, with no doubt, contributed to the failure of the many banks in 2008 
and the outbreak of the financial crisis that hit the world’s financial market (BIS, 2013). 
Therefore, the global community needed better regulatory principles that would make sure that 
banks kept more capital, engaged in less riskier activities and were liquid enough for the 
preparation of adverse times to come. However, it is worth mentioning that even before the 
collapse of the Lehman Brothers (first victim of the 2008 financial crisis), the Committee had 
already realised the need to improve the BASEL II Accord. Although it was too late, in 2009, the 
Committee introduced a set of principles that would later be known and BASEL 2.5. These were 
the “Principles for sound liquidity risk management and supervision” and were meant to 
strengthen BASEL II. These principles were among others that were proposed so as to make the 
second Accord better at dealing with the growth of the risky trading (securitisation) that was 
threatening the efficiency of the banking system (BIS, 2013).  
The new Accord was announced in 2010 and, as its failed predecessor, was meant to be 
implemented over time (in phases) but was stricter especially now that the Committee had seen 
how far banks were willing to go to increase their short term profits. Kohli et.al. (2013) argues 
that in addition to the three main concerns of capital, leverage and liquidity; the Committee also 
added one more factor that the Accord would be focusing on, and that was capital funding. The 
Accord would be rested upon three main pillars which would help foster the way forward for the 
crippled financial system and help prevent a disastrous phenomenon like the 2008 financial crisis 
from happening again. The 2008 global financial crisis had illustrated that banks were surviving 
on the knife edge especially when it came to capital holdings. Not only did the banks, prior to 
the crisis, have small amounts of capital, but it was of poor quality as well.  
Pillar 1 was the Minimum Regulatory Capital Requirements based on Risk Weighted Assets 
(RWAs). This maintained capital being calculated through credit, market and operational risk 
areas. It would cover the issues regarding capital, risk coverage and leverage (Goyal, 2013; BCBS, 
2013). Therefore, the first issue that the new Accord laid out was the new definitions of capital 
which was meant to improve the transparency and the excellence of the capital base (BIS, 
2013:14). BASEL III redefined capital to exclude the third tier that was present in the previous 
Accord; therefore there were now only two tiers of capital that would make the total regulatory 
capital. Tier 1 would include common equity and additional tier 1 capital. Under the common 
equity, only common shares that would fit well within the properties of regulatory common 
shares would be permitted to be part of capital, e.g., ordinary shares. The additional tier 1 capital 
included financial instruments, and regulatory adjustment calculations that would best fit the 
quality criteria, just as the Accord had proposed. 
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 Tier 1 also included surplus of stocks that would have resulted from the sale of shares by the 
bank or the firm, i.e., the share premium. Furthermore, accumulated revenue from any other 
activities that would fit the quality criteria, such as retained earnings and as well as reserves, 
would fall into this category of capital. The issue of quality of capital could not be stressed 
enough as tier 1 was surely meant to make sure that this goal was reached. Tier 2 would then 
have other capital sources that would include certain loan losses and the other instruments that 
would meet the quality criteria (PWC, 2011: 7). 
To help with the calculation of the capital as per the two tiers, the capital adequacy ratio was 
reinforced. Otherwise known as the capital to risk weighted asset ratio, it measures a bank’s 
capital in relation to risk exposure and assets. It is therefore a ratio of the sum of the tier 1 and 2 
capital with the risk weighted assets (BIS, 2012), as shown in Equation 1 below: 
Capital adequacy ratio= 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 1 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐+𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 2 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑤𝑤𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 …………………………………………..(1) 
where the risk weighted exposures are determined according to what the BASEL Committee set 
down as assets for banks. Tiers 1 and 2 have been defined above. For a bank to stay solvent and 
avoid the risk of a declining value of assets, therefore keeping it efficient, it has to be positively 
capitalised, with the value of its capital exceeding its liabilities. Hence, under BASEL III, capital 
adequacy ratios were upgraded (BCBS, 2013: 4). Larson (2011) states that since banks make 
loans by accepting deposits, which are liabilities, a high capital base would protect the bank in the 
case of a bank run. The capital adequacy ratio was also meant to improve the solidity and 
proficiency of the banking and financial systems by making sure that the banks would always be 
able to absorb losses and stay solvent. Therefore, low capital adequacy would mean a bank 
would be able to absorb less losses before it becomes insolvent (RBNZ, 2007: 2).  
Apart from the definitions of capital that were laid out in the new framework, the Committee 
decided to exclude a number of previously used capital sources that they deemed risky. These 
included goodwill and other intangible assets, investments in the instruments that made up part 
of tier 1 capital, deferred tax and many others (PWC, 2011). After these deductions, the 
minimum equity that would make up the capital requirement was raised to 4.5% of all risk 
weighted assets (BCBS, 2013). This was meant to strengthen the quality of the capital that the 
banks would be holding at any point in time.  
BASEL III did not only define capital but also introduced two capital buffers. These were meant 
to protect the banks during times of an economic downturn. The first capital buffer, the capital 
conservation buffer, was meant to absorb bank losses during times of financial stress. Banks 
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 were required to hold or build capital buffers that comprised common equity of 2.5% of the risk 
weighted assets outside times of financial stress so that when the economy was not performing 
well, the buffer would act as a cushion (BCBS, 2013). Banks were allowed to draw from the 
buffers during the periods of financial stress, but then were also obliged to make sure that this 
buffer was always replenished. This could be achieved through cutting back the distribution of 
earnings to dividends, for instance, and / or raising more capital (under the right recommended 
regulations) from the private sector (Lekatis, 2011). To enforce the conservation buffer even 
more, the Committee proposed that banks that would have their capital levels fall beyond the 
capital buffer be given punitive regulatory measures or fined.  
The second capital buffer, the countercyclical buffer, was introduced to protect banks from the 
harsh natures of the economic cycles, the effects of bubbles bursting and the negative 
consequences of the risky trading banks often take part in. Just like the conservation buffer, the 
countercyclical buffer would also be built up during times of non-financial stress and then 
released when the economy was not performing well. The buffer ranges from 0 to 2.5% of the 
risk weighted assets and the failure of a bank to follow the rules of the countercyclical buffer 
would result in penalties on the guilty bank (BIS, 2013: 25). 
As mentioned earlier, Pillar 1 also covered the issues of risk coverage. BASEL II, as noted 
before, caused the rapid increase in the rate at which banks were risk trading which resulted in 
risky securitisation. This ultimately resulted in many banks adopting high leverage conditions. 
BASEL III was designed to have a limit on securitisation and therefore requires banks to do 
more thorough credit checks when it comes to securitisation exposures (BCBS, 2013). The new 
Accord also requires extensive regulation on the other instruments that banks trade in which 
may include derivatives and other over the counter instruments. These are very volatile, 
especially derivatives, and therefore require a good amount of capital to back them in the case of 
losses from defaults. As much as defaults go, the Committee suggested that banks not only make 
thorough credit checks on clients but also reinforce the management of the counterparty credit 
risk framework (BIS, 2013: 28). This was meant to avoid a situation like the one that affected 
banks in the 2008 financial crisis when they failed to recover from the high amount of defaults 
by many loan takers. Therefore, the Committee suggested that additional capital be set aside as a 
charge for losses that would ensue from the trading of risky instruments and the defaults of 
loans.  
Of focus again under the first pillar was the issue of bank leverage, which is the extent to which a 
bank finances its assets through debt rather than equity, since the former is a cheaper source of 
19 | P a g e  
 
 finance. While high leverage can lead to higher profits for banks, it can lead to increased losses 
and erode a bank’s capital during unfavourable conditions, as was the case during the 2008 crisis. 
A situation of very high leverage also requires that the assets generate returns sufficient to cover 
the cost of debt finance. If the return falls, which may be the case in times of financial stress, 
high leverage becomes problematical (BCBS, 2014: 1). The problem would be initiated with 
banks continuously granting bad and / or unsecured loans and a bank run would lead to 
insolvencies (D’Hustler, 2009: 1). High leverage is regarded as a major contributor to the 2008 
crisis, and the BASEL Committee accordingly proposed a “non-risk based leverage ratio to 
supplement the risk based capital framework of BASEL II”.  
The leverage ratio is measured by dividing the bank’s capital by its total exposure (BIS, 2012),as 
shown in Equation 2 below: 
Leverage ratio= 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇…………………………………………………………...(2) 
The BASEL Committee defined the capital measure as Tier 1 capital and the exposure measure 
as the aggregation of four components, namely the banks’ on balance sheet exposures, off 
balance sheets exposures, derivative exposures and securities financing transaction (SFT) 
exposures; which are basically total assets. The main difference between the leverage and the 
capital adequacy ratios (see Equation 1) is that the capital adequacy ratio includes only the risk 
weighted assets (exposures) while the leverage ratio’s denominator is total assets. It is also 
expected that in time the leverage ratio would replace the capital adequacy ratio as the main 
measure of risk which regulators would prescribe. The BASEL Committee’s current proposal for 
the ratio is that it should be at a minimum of 3% which countries can deviate from if they feel 
they need to be stricter on the banks (BIS, 2012: 32; BCBS, 2014).The implementation of the 
ratio is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 3. 
However, the Committee proposed the leverage ratio as a non-binding requirement, and as a 
suggestion that banks could implement with time under regular supervisory advice(BIS, 2012: 
32). By 2017, a bank would also be required to give a detailed account of its leverage ratio: along 
with the process of leverage risk management, the factors that affected the leverage ratio and the 
measure used to calculate the ratio. Total disclosure of the banks’ books is one of the main issues 
that the new Accord was meant to attain so that clients would measure the riskiness that a bank 
has before banking with it. It would also provide the regulators with a good insight into the 
financial soundness of the banking system and make sure tighter regulation is implemented if 
necessary to prevent a banking system failure.  
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 The implications this ratio will have on banks has been the subject of debate between the 
international banking community and the BASEL Committee. The Committee responded to this 
by amending the requirements in 2014 to make the requirements more accommodative of banks 
activities. According to Scheepers (2014), the leverage ratio will lower banks’ profits as the assets 
that would be required to be deleveraged affect profitability. As sources of capital are now 
limited, the higher cost of capital would also mean a lower return on shareholders’ returns. This 
can have the consequence of lowering investment opportunities for banks. The leverage 
requirements will also mean that banks will have to incur additional costs for the complete 
implementation of the ratio as there is additional reporting that is required and as well as extra 
auditing by external auditors. These and many other possible negative effects of the leverage 
ratio on the banks were the concerns that were raised to the Committee. 
Pillar 2 of the BASEL III Accord was dedicated to risk management and the supervision of the 
banking system. The idea was to reiterate the issues of securitisation and risk exposure and the 
fact that tighter risk management tools were required within the banks. Better risk management 
tools were to be attained through appointing qualified and readily available supervisory teams, 
good corporate governance, constant risk testing, well managed accounting practices as well as 
full disclosure (BCBS, 2013). The importance of risk management could not be stressed enough, 
especially for those banks that could not resist trading under high risk conditions, i.e. those that 
would trade with very high leverage ratios. It had been noted that many weaknesses within the 
banks that included poor risk management tools resulted in major financial stress; therefore it 
was paramount that these issues be addressed in the new Accord (Rutledge, 2009).  
Pillar 3 laid down the market discipline requirements and this was a meant to strengthen the 
regulatory stance on securitisation and risk trading. Market discipline also covered the area 
concerning disclosure of the banks’ books and the activities that they would be engaged in. The 
Committee argued that market discipline would give the banks the incentive to strengthen capital 
regulation so as to make the system more efficient and could also give the supervisors towards 
the need to make the banking and the financial system less vulnerable to shocks.  Therefore, the 
main purpose of the third and last pillar was to compliment the first two pillars by requesting 
banks to make certain disclosures so that the market could assess their riskiness before getting 
into business with them. Such information is collectable within the bank, therefore not only 
making it easy to disclose but less costly as well. This was the other incentive that the Committee 
created for the banks so as to encourage disclosure (BIS, 2001).  
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 Despite having defined the three main pillars for BASEL III, the Committee still believed that 
the lack of high and good quality liquid assets was one of the many problems banks experienced 
that had led to most of them failing in 2008. Therefore, apart from the three pillars, the new 
Accord has a section that deals with the liquidity standards and supervisory monitoring. Liquidity 
is the ease with which a bank can convert its assets into cash. The BASEL III Accord introduced 
ratios to help in the calculation of bank liquidity. It covers two liquidity ratios; the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR).  
The LCR requires banks to hold high quality liquid assets. Since banks issue loans which make 
up part of their assets, loan defaults would mean they are no longer liquid; therefore, high quality 
liquid assets would prevent bank failure in times of financial stress (Bouwman, 2013: 1; BIS, 
2013: 4). The LCR would not work on its own to monitor the bank’s levels and quality of 
liquidity but the Committee believed it had to be supplemented by high supervisory assessments 
and a good liquidity management framework. This liquidity ratio is therefore given by the ratio of 
high quality liquid assets (HQLA) to total net liquidity outflows. Under the new Accord, the 
liquidity ratio is expected to be more than 100% as shown in Equation 3 below (BCBS, 2013: 7).  
LCR=  ≥ 100%𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅ℎ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑅𝑅 𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑇𝑇 𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐 30 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅 𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ................................................(3) 
High quality liquidity would ensure that during the times of financial stress, a bank could be able 
to meet its liabilities with ease for a period of no less than 30 days; thereafter other measures 
would be taken (BCBS, 2013: 4). 
The BASEL Committee did not only advocate for more capital but also for good quality capital. 
The aim of the NSFR is to ensure that banks always have high quality and more stable bases of 
funding or capital (BCBS, 2014: 6). It is defined as the ratio of the available amount of stable 
funding to the required amount of stable funding and at all times should be above 100%, as 
shown in Equation 4 below: 
NSFR=  ≥ 100%𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜 𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇 𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜 𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇 𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤 ...........................................................................(4) 
Just like the LCR, the NSFR is also supplemented by high supervisory assessments and a good 
liquidity management framework. The Committee argued that for many banks during 2007, 
despite having enough capital, they had poor liquidity management tools which also contributed 
to their failures in 2008. Therefore, the NSFR aims at also strengthening the liquidity 
management tools that banks have in place, thus demonstrating the importance of liquidity as a 
supplementary tool in avoiding bank failures (BCBS, 2014; Sheng, 2013).  
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 2.6BASEL III POLICY DIRECTIONS 
In 2010, the Committee set up the Long-term Economic Impact Group (LEIG) which was 
meant to assess the long term impacts of implementing the new Accord. The LEI estimated the 
long term benefits and costs of implementing BASEL III and discovered that BASEL III did 
lower the probability of the occurrence of a financial crisis and that this also results in boosting 
of the economy. To assess the impact that BASEL III was to have on the economies, the 
Committee set up the Macroeconomic Assessment Group (MAG). Although the MAG 
concluded that the macroeconomic costs of implementing BASEL III would be minimal, they 
did find out that there would be a steady increase in the bank lending rates; consequently 
lowering the demand for credit and this would in turn negatively affect the economy (Aosaki, 
2013).  
However, the effects that the new Accord will have on countries would vary.  Factors such as 
the size of the banking sector in relation to a country’s GDP, a country’s past and current 
macroeconomic condition, each country’s regulatory framework and the difference or gap 
between current ratios and the ratios that are required by BASEL III; would determine the 
extent to which and how a country and its banking system is affected by the implementation of 
the new Accord. For instance, regarding the ratios, the closer a bank’s ratio levels are to the 
required levels, the lesser the changes it has to go through to accommodate the implementation 
of BASEL III and therefore the impact of the new Accord would be minimal. This is despite the 
fact that every bank at any time will have to raise more capital on the recommendation of the 
regulators (Aosaki, 2013). 
On the other hand, the impact of the new Accord on the emerging markets is another issue that 
has been of great interest to many economists and to which a lot of literature has been dedicated. 
The major concern is that the one size fits all policy still exists in the new Accord and this may 
have major problems for the developing nations. Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010) argue 
that when BASEL III was developed, the main concern the regulators had was in regard to 
Europe and USA; therefore the recommendations were meant to fit into these systems and not 
the developing ones. Therefore, implementing the BASEL III Accord in the developing markets 
would be costly, thus limiting economic growth in these countries. Of particular concern is the 
LCR which requires banks to hold high quality liquid assets. These include high quality 
government and corporate bonds. The problem with these is that they are not readily available in 
the developing nations and non-existent in the Islamic markets, making them expensive to 
acquire (Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson, 2010). 
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 For banks, the requirement to hold more high quality liquid assets would mean that since the 
costs of acquiring these assets are high because of their scarcity, the overall profitability of the 
banks will be negatively affected. Nevertheless, the introduction of this new LCR requirement 
will also reduce the vulnerability of the banks during economic down-turns by improving their 
stability. Under the liquidity ratio is the NSFR that will require the banks to strengthen their 
sources of funding and this again would not only raise the costs of capital but reduce their 
profits as well. It is also argued that the much stronger and better funded banks that can afford 
the higher costs of funding will then be able to influence the market lending rates, thus driving 
the smaller banks out of the industry and creating a barrier to entry for the other potential banks, 
and thus ultimately reducing the levels of competition within the industry (KPMG, 2011: 9). 
Lack of competition would most probably reduce efficiency.  
The increase in the capital adequacy levels also poses problems for the banks as it may 
consequently reduce their profits and the benefits their shareholders may get in the form of low 
dividends. To add to the problems, since capital was redefined to exclude most of the easier and 
less costly sources, the costs of raising capital have not only risen, but the “flexibility of the 
national regulators to allow certain instruments to be included in as capital” has been limited, 
making regulation harder (KPMG, 2011: 9). The increase in the costs of acquiring capital also 
means that the banks are well justified to increase their lending rates. This would have major 
long run negative effects on the economy, in particular the demand for loans to finance new 
investment (Auboin and Blengini, 2014: 3). There is also the concern that while the increase in 
capital adequacy is meant to bring stability and reduce the risk in the banking sector, it may 
actually be the source of more banking risk. The argument is that as much as tighter regulation 
may be advantageous, it may cause banks to act irrationally because as regulation tightens, banks’ 
profits fall and this would leave them with nothing to lose when faced with bankruptcy. Banks 
therefore have the incentive to increase their risk mostly because under tighter regulation, “the 
marginal return on risk is increased” (Blum, 1999: 756).  
However, these and many other negative implications that this new Accord might have on the 
economy and the banking systems of the developing and the developed countries should not 
overshadow the many benefits that it is meant to bring. Although the taskforces that were 
assigned to investigate the future implications of BASEL III found some negative effects, they 
also realised that the long-run benefits of the new Accord would cover the costs incurred when 
implementing it. This is because BASEL III reduces the occurrence of financial crises by a high 
proportion and it is important to note that financial crises have long term negative effects on 
economies. With financial crises eliminated, the economies have the flexibility to grow without 
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 any entanglement. (Aosaki, 2013). BASEL III does not only have regulatory requirements for 
banks alone but for all the financial lending firms that do almost the same business as banks 
known as shadow banking. While it has been argued that banks were at the centre of the 2008 
financial crisis, it is worth noting that it was not only their actions that resulted in the fall of the 
global financial system but also actions of other financial firms as well. Therefore, a strong 
regulatory framework that BASEL III proposes for the banks and financial firms would make 
the financial system more efficient. Keeping in mind the fact that this Accord is being 
implemented over a period of time, it is only time that will objectively spell out its benefits and 
shortcomings.  
2.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has given some insights into the development of regulation and supervision of the 
banks and the financial sector by analysing the three BASEL Accords. The shortcomings of the 
two earlier Accords were also analysed and the reasons for the creation of new regulations 
identified. It has also been concluded that although there are possible shortcomings to the 
implementation of the new Accord, the long term benefits will overshadow its implementation 
costs. However, the impact that BASEL III will have on the developing countries is still to be 
explored and the next chapter will bring that to light. Chapter 3 will focus on the evolution of 
regulation, the implementation of BASEL III and possible implications in South Africa, Brazil 
and China while also investigating the existence of regulatory alignment amongst these BRICS 
trading partners.  
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 CHAPTER 3 
HISTORY OF BANK REGULATION, IMPLEMENTATION OF BASEL III AND 
REGULATORY POLICY ALIGNMENT BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA, CHINA AND 
BRAZIL 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The BASEL III framework is meant to be implemented in phases over the period 2010-2019. 
Therefore, it is crucial that the execution of these regulatory standards be done in a consistent 
manner so as to improve the global banking system. This long phase in applying the new Accord 
is meant to limit the transitional costs of the implementation that may negatively affect economic 
growth. The long-term phase in timeline will be dealt with differently from region to region, 
however, the BASEL Committee still set up a Regulatory Consistency Assessment 
Programme (RCAP) which will monitor that the standards are implemented timely and 
effectively as well as to report the progress to the Committee (BIS, 2013: 1).  
In terms of the manner of implementation and timeline, the BASEL Committee divided 
countries into two distinct groups and these are the member and non-member countries. 
According to Aosaki (2013: 9), the member countries are the ones required to follow the timeline 
stated above with capital regulation starting in 2013 and expected to be fully phased in by 2019. 
The non-member countries on the other hand are not required to make the implementation of 
the new Accord their main priority in terms of strengthening their banking regulation. The 
introduction of BASEL III will also be affected by the level of economic development; 
therefore, the implementation of the Accord will differ between the developed and the 
developing countries. De-Krivoy (2000: 114) states that the economic and financial restrictions 
faced by any country influence the pace at which it implements international standard 
regulations. This therefore means that any standards to be implemented have to be phased in 
gradually and with care.  
3.2 BANK REGULATION AND BASEL III IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The rapid growth of the banking sector and the development of globalization over the years has 
made it a global priority to make regulation of the financial and the banking sectors robust. This 
is because the more a country depends on the outside world, the more it feels obliged to 
implement and abide by the proposed international regulatory standards. Therefore, the 
developing world is no exception to this and, as literature points out the need for tight regulation 
in the developing world has grown ever since most developing countries have started embarking 
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 on a quest of financial liberalization. Financial liberalization has been viewed as a way of 
improving the efficiency for the financial markets and also boosting economic growth through 
free capital flows (Klomp and Haan, 2013: 2). This has therefore facilitated the growth of the 
banking and financial sectors and has increased the vulnerability of the emerging markets to 
contagion. The rise in such concerns and the lessons that have been learnt from past errors has 
also, over the past decade, led to the rapid progression of financial and banking regulation in the 
developing countries through the many changes in the laws that govern these sectors (De-
Krivoy, 2000). The developing countries have therefore, for many reasons, managed to improve 
the way they supervise their financial and banking sectors.  
Any policy reform brings with it some challenges and when it comes to the developing countries, 
these challenges have been many. De-Krivoy (2000) argues that the greatest challenge that the 
developing countries face when attempting to make their financial systems more sound is 
effective implementation of the regulatory policies. Regulatory effectiveness encompasses a 
number of aspects that the regulatory agents should take into account; and these include the 
availability of resources (human capital, information and funding), flexibility of the laws, the 
integrity of the regulators and the government itself, and above all the political will of the 
government (Makhaya, 2002). These and many other aspects that have to be considered when 
making an effective regulatory policy in the developing countries, have contributed to the many 
challenges that these countries face. It has also been argued that despite having improved 
regulatory-wise, developing countries still face regulatory difficulties as many of the policies that 
they are forced to implement have been designed mainly for the well developed countries and 
this one size fits all policy makes it very difficult to achieve pure regulatory efficiency. These 
frameworks suit the developed countries well because they have the required resources, the 
skilled financial supervisors, stable economies, political stability, or in other words the means to 
implement the policies. These are resources that the developing countries lack immensely 
(Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick, 2000).  
The possibility of implementing BASEL III in the developing countries has therefore been a 
debatable subject. Many banks in the developed countries have asked for more flexibility and 
more time to implement the new Accord. This is ironic for it raises the question of what banks 
in the developing countries would then want, considering that they have less than enough 
resources to effectively implement the new regulations as compared to their counterparts in the 
developed countries. As far as the emerging markets are concerned, it is important to note that 
there are countries within this group that have developed more than others. In some of the 
countries, like China and Brazil, consumer confidence on the soundness and efficiency of their 
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 banking systems is higher compared to some developed countries like the USA and the Euro. 
However, this doesn’t mean that the implementation of the new Accord in these countries is 
going to be smooth, because despite improved credit worthiness and improved bank soundness, 
many impeding factors are still to be considered before trying to implement BASEL III in the 
developing countries (Valladares, 2012).  
3.2.1 Bank regulation in South Africa 
The South African banking system has grown to be one of the well regulated, efficient and well 
managed, not only in Africa but the world as well. Over the past two decades, the system has 
become more efficient through effective legislation and technological advances. South Africa 
boasts one of the largest financial systems in the world and as such has been no stranger to the 
effects of the volatility of the financial sector. Lessons from the failures of the financial and 
banking sectors in the 1990s have led to the current strong grip on regulation (BASA, 2012). 
While many countries have taken the responsibility of bank regulation away from their central 
banks and placed it in the hands of the government or private regulators, South African banking 
regulation is still a function of the central bank. While the law does not prohibit anyone from 
lending funds, it only recognises banks as the deposit takers. In the event that the deposits the 
banks take are used irresponsibly, there is a high chance that the depositors will lose their 
savings; therefore the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) focuses on the principle of protecting 
the depositors and views this as one of the main reasons why banks should be supervised 
(SARB, 2014). 
The SARB has created a division that is mainly responsible for bank regulation, which the Bank 
Supervision Department (BSD). The main aim of the BSD is to help to achieve financial stability 
by, inter alia, advocating for a sound banking system. According to SARB (2014), the BSD works 
on the following international principles: 
• The 29 Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (the Core Principles) as published by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS); and 
• The Basel II, Basel 2.5 and Basel III frameworks, which are widely regarded as the de facto standard 
for supervising banks. 
These and other principles have helped to foster in the constant improvement in the supervision 
of banks and to attain the main goals of the department (a sound banking system) as South 
Africa's banking system is now ranked 2nd out of 144 countries for soundness (BASA, 2012). The 
supervision of the South African banking system rests on a set of legislative laws that have been 
put into tiers as follows: 
28 | P a g e  
 
 Tier 1: Banks Act, 1990 (Act No. 94 of 1990), Co-operative Banks Act, 2007 (Act No. 40 of 
2007) and Mutual Banks Act, 1993 (Act No. 124 of 1993); 
Tier 2: The Regulations relating to banks, to co-operative banks and to mutual banks; and  
Tier 3: Banks Act, Co-operative Banks Act and Mutual Banks Act: Directives, Circulars and 
Guidance Notes. 
 
To complement these three tiers, the BSD also uses other legislative laws to efficiently supervise 
the banking system. These include:  
• The South African Reserve Bank Act, 1989 (Act No. 90 of 1989);  
• The Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 2001 (Act No. 38 of 2001); 
• The Companies Act, 2008 (Act No. 71 of 2008); and 
• The Postbank Limited Act, 2010 (Act No. 9 of 2010) (SARB, 2014). 
 
Despite the volatile nature of the South African banking and financial sectors in the past, the 
country has managed to create a sound and efficient financial and banking system, through 
strong legislation and regulation.  
3.2.2 Bank regulation in Brazil 
Brazil, like any other developing country, has also experienced the effects of the volatile nature 
of the global and domestic financial and banking systems. On the other hand, just like South 
Africa, Brazil has managed to build a sound banking system through strict regulations. The tight 
regulations that the Brazilian government imposed on the banks contributed strongly to them 
surviving the financial crisis of 2008 (Da-Costa, 2009). Like South Africa, Brazil also drew 
lessons from the experiences of past crises to make their banking system stronger. Da-Costa 
(2009) mentions that the 1990s’ crises forced the government to re-evaluate their supervision 
strategies. The banking and financial activities that are carried out in Brazil are subject to laws 
and restrictions that have been passed by the government. According to Filho and Ramos 
(2014), there are three main regulators for the Brazilian capital markets, which include the 
banking sector. These are the Central Bank of Brazil; the National Monetary Council and the 
Brazilian Securities and Exchanges Commission.  
To strengthen regulation in the country, the government also set up self-regulators for the 
regulation of securities trading. This is to monitor the manner in which institutions authorised to 
trade in certain securities, are trading them. Bank regulators in Brazil have also been commended 
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 for their tight laws regarding capital requirements. Ever since 1995, the Brazilian central bank has 
requested all financial institutions’ capital adequacy requirements to conform to the BASEL 
Accords (I, II and III). While the Accords have a certain capital requirement (8% as mentioned 
in Chapter 2), the Brazilian financial institutions are required to maintain a ratio of at least 11% 
(Filho and Ramos, 2014). Da-Costa (2009) further mentions that the definitions of capital for 
banks in Brazil have also been narrowed. This is meant to avoid the American and European 
situation in 2008 where banks used worthless or risky assets as capital which later led to the 
banking crisis.  
On top of all these requirements, the central bank has also imposed a high reserve ratio on 
deposits to protect the depositors and avoid the bankruptcy of banks in the event of bank runs. 
Although this tight requirement has been condemned for stalling not only credit demand, but the 
willingness and ability of banks to lend, it has also been praised for giving banks the liquidity they 
needed to avoid the effects of the 2008 crisis (Da-Costa, 2009). Despite the fact that Brazil was 
not fully sheltered from the effects of the 2008 crisis, tight regulation certainly helped to avoid 
total disaster, as compared to other developed countries whose regulatory systems were thought 
to be efficient.  
3.2.3 Bank regulation in China 
Ping (2012) mentions that the credit that banks provide is regarded as the main source of 
funding for the Chinese economy to the extent of contributing more than three quarters of 
China’s total funding (loans and advances) for the period 2008-2009. With this in mind, the 
supervision of the banking sector in China is regarded as a priority and being able to control this 
sector would determine how the government can manage the whole economy. The need for 
more bank regulation was also brought about by the fact that China’s international trade and 
financial interests have grown over the years; therefore it has been interacting more and more 
with the outside world. This has increased the vulnerability of its financial system to the effects 
of contagion. This was the case during the 2008 financial crisis as the Chinese economy also 
went into a recession as a result of the American sub-prime crisis. However, the Chinese banking 
sector did not suffer as much as compared to other countries’ banking sectors and this has been 
accredited to the tight regulations that have been in place for decades in the country (Sandgren, 
2008) 
Banking regulation in China was once the responsibility of the central bank, the People’s Bank of 
China (PBoC), but decades of reconstruction, with the aim of perfecting the way banks are 
monitored, has resulted in the duties of this task being split. This resulted in the establishment of 
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 the main banking regulatory body, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), which 
still reports to the state (Ping, 2012). According to Ping (2012), the PBoC, the CBRC and 
ultimately the central government are the three main organisations that are mainly responsible 
for bank supervision in China. Both the PBoC and the CBRC report to the central government 
and the state has also retained the power to control bank lending, which as mentioned earlier is 
regarded as the main driver of the Chinese economy.  
The objectives of the CBRC have been categorised into general and specific objectives. Under 
the general objectives, the CBRC aims to promote the efficiency, effectiveness and the 
soundness of the Chinese banking system and encouraging fair and healthy competition within 
the industry. Under the specific objectives, the organisation aims at protecting the values and 
needs of the depositors. Just like the South African and Brazilian regulatory authorities, Chinese 
regulators also believe that the protection of the interests of the depositors or consumers would 
ensure that the financial sector is always stable and efficient. The PBoC is now mainly 
responsible for the formulation and implementing of the monetary policies that govern the way 
the whole financial system works (CBRC, 2014; Ping, 2012). Bank regulation in China is also not 
immune to the political environment of the country and this is unavoidable since there are many 
state owned banks in the country. This has brought about concerns of whether there can be a 
conflict of interest for the state when it comes to effective regulation of these banks. However, 
over the years the role of regulation of all banks under the banking laws has gradually been 
passed on to the CBRC, while the state is mainly focusing on economic growth, which shows a 
major improvement in the country’s regulatory standards (Ping, 2012).  
China, like Brazil and South Africa, also ensures that its banks follow the recommended 
regulatory rules of the BASEL Committee. The PBoC requested that all banks comply with the 
BASEL I requirements in 1994 (later fully implemented in 2004) while the CBRC ordered banks 
to implement the BASEL II requirements in 2008 (Jun, 2012). In 2012, the country announced 
its plans to have the new Accord, BASEL III, implemented rapidly following its release in 2010 
but later opted for a gradual implementation approach for which they released a timetable (see 
section 3.3.1). China is an example of an emerging economy that has managed to do well in 
regulating its banking system and making it efficient.  
3.2.4 Concluding remarks 
Bank regulation in the emerging markets has met some problems that have included the lack of 
needed resources and information, poor implementation tools, political interference and above 
all the effects of the one size fits all policy. However, this has not deterred them from 
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 implementing strict regulatory rules that have managed to shield their financial sectors from the 
negative effects of contagion that has since been brought about by the growth in globalisation. 
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, there is a real need for the existence of regulatory alignment 
between trading partners as all countries follow most of the same BASEL rules of regulation. 
3.3 BASEL III PLANNING AND GENERAL TIMELINE 
The implementation of the new Accord has been designed to be phased in; with countries 
expected to have reached the new standards by a certain time. This approach in implementing 
BASEL III was to make sure that banks can fully and efficiently implement the Accord while 
they also recovered from the effects of the 2008 financial crisis. It would also give those banks 
that needed large amounts of additional capital enough time to raise the capital as per the 
required standards. The transition process was not meant for the banks alone, but for the 
borrowers as well as it would ensure that during the process of implementation the banks would 
have the room to lend and support economic growth (BIS, 2012). Therefore, an effective 
implementation of the Accord will not only contribute to better bank competitiveness and better 
management, but will also show the regulators that the banks are recovering well from the 2008 
financial crisis.  
However, much planning has to go into the implementation process for it to be efficient and 
successful. This includes strengthening the management capabilities of the bank so as to be able 
to embrace the change that the Accord will bring. BASEL III has put new emphasis on risk 
management which means that there should be the introduction of better risk management 
frameworks. For these frameworks to be efficient, banks not only need to have better 
management capabilities but should also invest highly in technologies that will help in data 
management and capturing. The quick access to accurate data for banks is very crucial in the 
implementation process; therefore the technologies will not only ensure that the data is clean and 
is delivered efficiently, but also that data auditing is made easier (Chabanel, 2011). As mentioned 
before, one of the main challenges that banks in the developing countries face in trying to 
achieve efficient regulation is information asymmetry. Therefore, with better risk management 
capabilities and better data capturing technologies, this challenge can be eliminated.  
According to Chabanel (2011), although implementation of BASEL III is going to be different 
across continents, there have been proposed approaches of implementation published for 
regulators to follow. These approaches, which were introduced to make it easier for regulators 
and policy makers to implement the new regulatory principles, include incorporating the new 
principles into the existing regulatory framework or starting a whole new regulatory framework, 
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 meaning abandoning the already existing principles for the new ones. The first option of 
implementing the Accord on an existing framework includes making the necessary changes to 
the system so as to accommodate the new principles. This would allow the banks to gradually get 
used to then making sure that the Accord is effectively absorbed into the system. This is what 
the BASEL Committee had in mind when they decided that the framework be phased in rather 
than implemented quickly. Implementing the Accord gradually would also, as mentioned earlier, 
reduce costs as it is easier to make the existing system incorporate the new framework. Chabanel 
(2011) further argues that for this approach to work, the implementation planning should include 
having to extensively study and know how the existing framework is designed. This would allow 
for efficient implementation of the new regulations where they are really needed. This works 
efficiently in those countries that have their regulatory standards fully complying with the 
BASEL principles of regulation, (i.e. those countries that have implementing all the BASEL 
Accords). Other countries, e.g. the USA, completely skipped the implementation of BASEL II; 
therefore they would find it difficult to use this approach in implementing BASEL III 
(Valladares, 2012). 
The second alternative requires that the banks fully implement the Accord from scratch, i.e. 
deploying a new regulatory environment. This would mean completely replacing the old 
framework with the new. This may sound more costly than the first approach, but it has better 
long term benefits if the banks manage to effectively make the new framework completely part 
of its system. This, however, means that the short term costs are very high as they include high 
investments in technologies that would effectively define and understand the new framework 
first before implementing it. This is where data processing management also plays a big role as all 
the information is crucial in successfully implementing the new framework. For developed 
markets, such an approach would not be that damaging, compared to the developing markets, as 
they have the resources to fund it (Chabanel, 2011).  
After all the necessary planning has been done, banks have to follow the timeline 2013-2019 for 
the implementation of the new Accord. The BASEL Committee released a general timeline that 
countries can follow, despite the fact that the timelines will also vary from region to region. The 
general timeline of the new Accord is going to be spread over a ten year period starting in 2013. 
The phase-in arrangements have been split appropriately so as to accommodate the three ratios, 
i.e. the capital adequacy ratio, the leverage ratio and the liquidity ratio. The implementation of 
regulations on each ratio has its own timeline (BIS, 2013). The Committee decided that 2013 
would be the year to start the phase-in of the higher capital requirements. This would then be 
expected to be fully implemented by the end of 2014. According to BIS (2013), the capital 
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 requirement of 4% of total assets should be fully implemented by the end of 2014. This would 
then make way for the other phase-in arrangement regarding capital, specifically the capital 
conservation buffers. The general timeline set to begin the implementation of capital buffers in 
2016 and full implementation is expected to be in 2019. These capital buffers are expected to be 
2.5%; therefore in total by 2019 the capital plus buffers (taking into account the capital 
deductions) would be 10. 5% (BIS, 2013). As mentioned before, BASEL III puts more emphasis 
on better risk management and so the proposed risk management tools that have been included 
in the new framework were scheduled to be implemented by the start of 2013.  
As part of its requirements, BASEL III makes the disclosure of documents by banks a priority, 
especially the aforementioned ratios. However, moving on to the timeline of the leverage ratio, 
the Committee proposed that there be no rush in implementing the necessary requirements but 
supervisors monitor the ratios in the period 2011-2015 before disclosing them. The phase-in 
arrangements are such that supervisors track and analyse the leverage ratios in 2011 and 2013-
2015 without disclosing them. In 2017, based on the results of the analysis period, supervisors 
would prepare the leverage ratios for disclosure in 2018, in which disclosure is mandatory. The 
same phase-in procedure was proposed for the liquidity ratios as well as the Committee 
proposed that the liquidity ratios be monitored for the period 2011-2015. In 2015, the LCR will 
be introduced with a percentage of 60% which will increase by 10% each year until it is 100% by 
2019; while the NSFR will be introduced in 2018 (BIS, 2013; Joyce et.al, 2012).  
The general timeline that the BASEL Committee proposed is only going to serve as a guideline 
for regulators and policy makers, as there can be deviations from this timeline. Therefore, 
implementation of BASEL III is not expected to end in 2019, but will be extended a bit further 
to cater for countries that fall behind the deadline. The BASEL Committee of Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) also created a programme, the Regulatory Consistency Assessment 
Programme (RCAP), which is meant to establish the level of compliance of the countries that are 
implementing BASEL III. The programme also gathers information on how each individual 
country is planning to implement the new Accord and the progress made, before making 
recommendations on how the process can be improved upon.  
Reports published on assessments on China, Brazil and South Africa have shown that these 
three countries are in full compliance with the regulatory requirements, while recommendations 
were made for some of the flaws that were found in their systems.  
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 3.3.1 South Africa 
South Africa is one of the many developed countries that comply with the regulatory 
requirements that the international regulatory bodies like the Financial Stability Board and the 
BASEL Committee always set for countries to follow. In 2004, after the announcement of 
BASEL II, South Africa implemented the necessary changes to its financial and banking systems 
to implement this Accord, an exercise that lasted several years. After the 2008 financial crisis and 
the announcement of the new Accord, the country again geared up for the implementation of 
the new regulatory laws. Preparations began with the general assessment of the health of the 
country’s financial sector, for which a report by the National Treasury was released in 2011. The 
assessment was done to establish the areas of the financial sector that did and did not need 
regulatory reforms and as well as how to implement the new Accord. Results from the 
assessment revealed that the capital levels and leverage ratios for South African banks did not 
only comply with the BASEL requirements but actually exceeded them. Therefore, the Treasury 
saw it fit not to make any changes to the system, but to wait for the scheduled time for the 
implementation of BASEL III which was 2013 (Elliott, 2012: 49). 
In 2013, South Africa put in place amendments that would accommodate the new regulatory 
requirements. This included raising the quantity of capital so that banks would be able to 
withstand shocks. On the 1st of January 2013, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) issued a 
directive (Directive 5/2013) that included a set of amendments for banks that included the new 
prescribed capital, liquidity and leverage ratios. This document also included the timeline for the 
implementation of the new Accord, together with the detailed requirements that were in 
conformity with the BASEL III proposed framework (SARB, 2013).  
The amendments also included raising the quality of capital while mainly focusing on the sources 
of capital that the BASEL Committee had proposed, e.g. common equity, improving the risk 
management frameworks of the banks to avoid risk trading and protect depositors, introducing 
capital buffers which were suggested by the Committee for banks during times of economic 
stress, as well as introducing a leverage ratio as per the requirement by the BASEL Committee 
which would act as a supplementary tool for the effective function of the risk management 
framework (SARB, 2013; SARB, 2014). By the end of 2013, the SARB had already incorporated 
reformed regulations on both international and domestic banks, in relation to the BASEL III 
framework. The SARB also issued a directive that would show banks how to calculate and report 
the liquidity and the leverage ratios in accordance to the proposed BASEL regulations (BCBS, 
2013).  
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 The South African government also proposed a regulatory approach that would separate 
prudential conduct of the financial sector from market conduct (the twin peaks approach). 
Therefore, under the twin peaks approach, prudential regulators are responsible for maintaining 
the safety and the soundness of the banking and the financial systems, while the market conduct 
supervisors ensure that consumers’ interests are well catered for. The twin peaks approach aims 
at making the financial system more efficient and sound, while also advocating for consumer or 
depositors’ protection which would boost the confidence of the system. It also aims at 
encouraging accountability and transparency within the financial sector; a quality that the BASEL 
III framework also aims to achieve (see section 3.4.1 for further details). In preparation of the 
implementation of the twin peaks approach, the SARB has increased its staff and has created a 
prudential working group that includes experts from the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the 
SARB itself so as to have a co-ordinated approach to regulating the financial sector (Joffe, 2014).  
3.3.2 Brazil 
In 2007 Brazil implemented BASEL II and in 2012 announced their intentions of fully 
implementing BASEL 2.5 in accordance with the international regulations. This therefore made 
Brazil fully compliant with the BASEL regulation on banking supervision and hence 
implementation of BASEL III was expected to be smooth. Together with China and South 
Africa, Brazil is one of the many developing countries that began preparations for the 
implementation of BASEL III for 2013, earlier than expected. The Brazilian government made a 
total of 42 regulatory amendments by the end of 2013 so as to comply with the pre-
implementation requirements of BASEL III (BCBS, 2014: 22). Despite finally announcing the 
implementation of the new Accord in 2013, the government had already taken an aggressive 
approach when it came to preparing the implementation of BASEL III. They began the 
preparations 2011 and also aimed to be done with the full implementation before 2019. In 2011, 
the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) had planned it would implement the BASEL III regulatory 
requirements on capital, leverage and liquidity quality two years ahead of the deadline. (Elliott, 
2012: 42).   
In line with these goals, the central bank released a directive (Notice 20,615 of 2011) which gave 
the guidelines to banks on what was required for the implementation of BASEL III. The 
document included the new capital definitions, the new sources of capital, the ratios banks were 
required to hold in relation to leverage and liquidity as well; and above all the timeline that the 
banks had to follow in the implementation process. The timeline stipulated that the regulations 
dealing with risk management were to be announced in 2012. The central bank also planned to 
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 release in 2012, the calculations for the liquidity and the leverage ratios as per the requirements 
of the BASEL Committee (Banco do Brazil, 2011: 17).  
As soon as the central bank published the report that stipulated the new capital definitions and 
the instruments or securities that would and wouldn’t be used as sources of capital, banks 
(including the central bank itself) did not waste time, but immediately started selling securities to 
raise capital and meet the deadlines that had been set by the central bank. This is despite the fact 
that Brazilian banks were considered to be well capitalised in 2011 and had no need to raise more 
capital; further showing the nature of the aggressive regulatory approach of the central bank 
(Valladares, 2012). However, it is because of this fact that Brazilian banks were considered to be 
well capitalised that the Central Bank did not only ease the capital rules in 2013 but also chose to 
follow the timeline that had been proposed by the BASEL Committee. Capital rules were eased 
as banks were given more of capital sources, some of which the BASEL Committee had 
proposed not to be used, e.g. goodwill and deferred tax. The Central Bank also made it possible 
for banks to use some of their debt as qualifying capital in times of financial stress and went 
further to give them the flexibility of choosing forms of calculating risk (BCBS, 2013).  
As a result of this change in the Brazilian timeline, new general regulations for the preparations 
of BASEL III implementation were announced in 2013 and these were a set of four resolutions 
and 15 circulars that the Central Bank through the National Monetary Council (CMN) published 
(BCBS, 2013). According to Stuber and Stuber (2013), the four resolutions dealt with:  
• The new regulatory capital calculation methods and the division of capital into Tiers I 
and II; 
• The capital maintenance requirements and the calculation methods; 
• The additional capital sources, the calculation methods and the risk management tools; 
and 
• The new way of preparing and transferring collective information through the analytical 
trial balance sheet and the calculation of regulatory capital (Prudential Conglomerate). 
The 15 circulars on the other hand were devised so as to complement the four resolutions. The 
circulars introduced the methods to be followed when making changes to capital, calculating 
capital, calculating risk weighted assets (RWA) and managing risk (Stuber and Stuber, 2013). 
Through these and many more regulatory adjustments that the Brazilian government put in 
place, the implementation of BASEL III would be made efficient and the timeline followed.  
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 3.3.3 China 
The 2008 financial crisis together with the rapid growth in the banking industry in China called 
for banking regulations in China to be more efficient. Therefore, just like in Brazil and South 
Africa, when the 2008 financial crisis hit the global market, Chinese banks did not experience the 
full effects as they were protected by a healthy capital structure, which according to Elliott (2012: 
43), exceeded the international requirement but this did not mean that there was no need for the 
adoption of the BASEL III regulations. Chinese banks were on the verge of expanding into the 
western market in 2011, therefore tight international regulatory standards had to be adopted. Just 
like its Brazilian counterpart, the Chinese government had the intentions of an early 
implementation of the new BASEL Accord. Therefore in 2011, the Chinese government re-
assessed the health of the banking system to determine whether all banks were eligible for 
implementation and subsequently announced it (CBRC, 2011: 48; Valladares, 2012).  
China, having previously implemented BASEL II like South Africa and Brazil, also showed its 
full participation and willingness to implement the new regulations by making suggestions to the 
BCBS for better and efficient international regulations. These recommendations were in view of 
the negligent risk trading that was going on in the developed world and that a more strict and 
sound code of conduct had to be put in place so as to deal with these situations for globalisation 
had shown that the consequences of such actions would also be felt by the developing countries 
(CBRC, 2010: 56). 
To help make the implementation of BASEL III easier and more efficient for banks, the CBRC 
encouraged them to invest more in technology that would help in information gathering, as it 
would make the implementation process less costly and more efficient. Banks were also required 
to improve their risk management portfolios, establish better general management frameworks 
and efficient internal controls. Regulatory reforms that are in accordance with the published 
international standards were also put in place by the CBRC specifying the principles to be used 
in measuring capital and risk based capital as well as requiring banks not to deviate from the 
international regulations (CBRC, 2012).  
In 2012, the Chinese government also issued a timeline banks had to follow in implementing the 
BASEL III Accord. Despite having announced that the country would push for a rapid 
implementation approach, the government later opted for a more gradual approach, as had been 
suggested by the BASEL Committee, so as to accommodate the weaker banks that wouldn’t be 
able to raise the needed capital in time for the deadlines (Rabinovitch, 2012). According to Zou 
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 (2012: 45), the CBRC therefore split the capital regulations between the small and the big banks 
and required that: 
• The big banks should have, by the end of 2013: a) A core Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio of 
no less than 8.5 %; b) A Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio of no less than 9.5 %; and c) A capital 
adequacy ratio of no less than 11.5 %. The CBRC however gave banks no pressure so as to ease 
the implementation process, therefore banks were allowed, by the approval of the CBRC, meet 
the standards by the end of 2015, and 
• The smaller banks should have, by the end of 2016: a) A core Tier 1 capital adequacy 
ratio of no less than 7.5 %; b) A Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio of no less than 8.5 %; and c) A 
capital adequacy ratio of no less than 10.5 %. Also, with approval of the CBRC, smaller banks 
were also allowed to meet the standards by the end of 2018. 
 
China was therefore assessed to be in line with the required BASEL stipulations put in place for 
the implementation of the new Accord and the deviations that were found were amended.  
3.3.4 Concluding remarks 
The implementation of BASEL III was generally devised to be smooth and flexible and 
therefore individual countries’ governments have made sure that their banks can implement the 
Accord with ease. The preparations that were put in place by China, South Africa and Brazil to 
accommodate the implementation of BASEL III show that the necessary steps have been taken 
to comply with the BASEL requirements for the implementation of the new Accord. However, 
the reports that were done by the RCAP committee show that there are still alterations that are 
still to be made in all the three selected countries with regard to being compliant. In Brazil, there 
are some capital deductions that are still to be made while in South Africa and China some of the 
rules have still to be loosened so that the implementation process can be made easy for banks. 
Some of these recommendations made by the RCAP reports have already been implemented by 
the regulators in each country.  
3.4 IMPLEMENTING BASEL III 
The BASEL Committee proposed that for the process of implementation to be smooth and 
effective, the new Accord should be implemented in phases, under a certain timeline and in 
stages as well. This means that each of the three ratios that the Accord is focusing on (capital 
adequacy ratios, liquidity ratios and leverage ratios) will have a different timeline and schedule for 
implementation. The proposed timeline for implementation however is only a guideline and not 
compulsory for countries to follow, therefore it may take more or less time for some of the 
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 countries to fully implement it, while other countries have chosen to totally eliminate the phase-
in framework. As shown earlier in the previous section, each country might adopt a different 
timeline for implementing the new Accord.  
This section analyses the implementation timetables, the implementation methods and 
calculation methods which South Africa, Brazil and China used in the implementation process in 
line with the proposed BASEL timelines and methods. This will help establish the progress made 
with respect to the set deadlines as well as determining an alignment of implementation methods.  
3.4.1 South Africa 
South Africa formally started the process of implementing BASEL III in 2013 as per the 
scheduled BASEL timetable. On 4 April 2013, the SARB released a directive (Directive 5/2013) 
which stipulated the different capital tiers that each bank that traded in South Africa was entitled 
to hold. The directive also included the various elements such as systematic risk, phase-in 
arrangements of minimum requirements and individual capital requirements which had been 
suggested by the BASEL Committee in the BASEL III regulatory framework. The directive gave 
a specific distinction between the different capital Tiers which are Tier 1 and Tier 2. It also 
distinguishes between the general and the systematic risk capital structures that the banks are 
required to hold with effect from 1 January 2013. Capital holdings were stated in the directive to 
be different with regard to the types of banks, i.e. the domestic systematically important banks 
(D-SIB) and the global systematically important banks (G-SIB) would have different capital 
requirements. The new capital framework that the SARB proposed for the D-SIBs as per the 
BASEL regulations were to be announced in time for the 2016 BASEL schedule to be met. 
These capital requirements would also be specific per bank or bank group based on importance 
of the bank or bank group and would be phased-in over a three year period i.e. 2016-2019 
(SARB, 2013).  
As per general South African law, the Registrar of Banks specifies the capital requirements that 
banks were required to hold. Therefore, the capital systematic risk requirement was set at 1.5% 
of all risk weighted exposures with effect from 1 January 2013 and was scheduled to be increased 
by 0.5% to 2% by 31 December 2015. The Registrar made sure that this requirement would later 
align with the general capital requirement for the D-SIB that was scheduled for implementation 
in 2016 by ordering that the 2% adjustment be done during the general capital phase-in period. 
In this way, alignment of the framework would not only be achieved, but the factors that are 
related to systematic risk were also not double counted in the process; as double counting could 
have strained the structures of the banks especially with the high capital requirements in place.To 
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 ensure that implementation of BASEL III did not strain the banks, the SARB put in place 
measures to make the implementation as smooth and flexible as possible. The directive then 
notified all banks that the total capital adequacy requirements which included the capital 
systematic risk structure and the general capital requirements for the D-SIBs may not exceed 
3.5% of the banks’ risk weighted exposures. To add to this, the directive further states that the 
total capital adequacy requirements that all South African banks had to meet by the end of 2019 
would not exceed 14%; and this excluded the capital buffers and the individual capital 
requirements (ICR) (SARB, 2013). 
The BASEL Committee proposed that the ICR be phased-in from 2013 to 2019 and be split 
between Tier 1 and 2 capital frameworks. Tier 1 capital requirement would be 4.5% and Tier 2 
would be 6% and then taking into account the deductions that would be made during the phase 
in process, the total ICR would amount to 8%. The South African directive and timeline for 
capital requirements also conformed to these phase-in arrangements and as mentioned earlier, 
these were scheduled for implementation as from 1 January 2013. The ICR, as mentioned earlier, 
were meant to be different as per the different types of banks and the Registrar was to define 
them accordingly, using what was defined as the bucketing approach. Thereafter, the banks that 
would have been defined as D-SIBs would be informed and given their capital requirements 
accordingly (SARB, 2013).  
These ICR were to be prioritised as they were regarded as complements to the capital 
conservation buffer. Penalties would be rendered accordingly to those banks that would not 
comply with the capital conservation buffer and ICR requirements. The directive therefore gave 
the Registrar’s office the power to continue using its supervisory role of increasing or decreasing 
the levels of the ICRs.  Since the ICRs were only scheduled for implementation in 2016, the 
SARB ordered banks to refrain from publishing their ICR or general capital structures until the 
phase in process had been completed. This was done not only as a way of following the 
international disclosure standards but also as a way of avoiding market confusion especially since 
these requirements would change during the phase-in process (SARB, 2013). 
The directive then gave banks the order to hold higher capital buffers than the ones that the 
BASEL Committee had proposed, i.e. not below 6.5%. This ensured that any unexpected 
domestic and international adverse financial or non-financial factors would not easily affect the 
banks as they would be fully protected. Also, the Registrar’s office retained the role of 
supervising the meeting of these requirements. The conservation and the countercyclical buffers 
were scheduled for implementation as of 1 January 2016, together with the ICRs. These buffers 
41 | P a g e  
 
 aim at protecting banks form the effects of excessive economic growth, i.e. when there is 
excessive economic growth, there is high credit demand which might give banks the incentive to 
indulge in risky activities.  
The liquidity requirements that the BASEL Committee proposed for global banks were 
scheduled for introduction in 2015 but, even before 2013, South Africa had already taken steps 
in informing its banks of the need to comply with the prescribed liquidity regulations. The SARB 
and the bank supervision department issued a directive in 2012 (Directive 5/2012) which 
stipulated that all banks were obliged to hold the prescribed liquid assets. According to 
Ndzamela (2013), these assets include cash, “central bank reserves and certain marketable 
securities backed by central banks and sovereigns, certain government securities, covered bonds 
and corporate debt securities.” The South African banks have always been covered liquid asset-
wise through the classical cash reserve or liquidity deficit framework used by the SARB for 
implementing monetary policy and this framework has been upgraded so as to accommodate the 
international BASEL standards.  
Supervisors and regulators were instructed on how to deal with the extent to which cash and 
liquid reserves could be accessed and also the extent to which they could be drawn down during 
times of financial stress. The SARB would also require collateral when providing services to 
banks through this facility and the forms of collateral that the Central Banks accepted were listed 
in the directive. These included A-rated marketable debt securities, JSE listed equities and notes 
of self-securitised high quality loans. This facility was scheduled to be available to banks as from 
1 January 2013 (SARB, 2012).  
However, the need for the facility was duly reduced as the BCBS revised the liquidity 
requirements in 2013 and made them more flexible and less costly for banks. The Committee 
also added some assets to the list of accepted liquidity assets and, according to Ndzamel (2013), 
these included “residential mortgage-backed securities rated AA or higher, corporate debt 
securities rated A+ to BBB-, and equities that meet certain conditions.” These changes were 
acknowledged and implemented into the South African regulatory system as from 7 January 2013 
through Directive 2/2013 issued by the SARB.  
The regulations that pertain to leverage ratios and also the calculation of the leverage ratios, as 
according to the BASEL Committee, were also included into the South African BASEL III 
implementation schedule and for implementation from 1 January 2013. The BASEL Committee 
proposed that the leverage ratio be set at a minimum of 3% but most countries including South 
Africa decided to be more strict on banks in this aspect. Therefore, despite the fact that South 
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 African banks have low leverage ratios as compared to other international banks, the BSD in 
South Africa set the leverage ratio at 4% for implementation from 1 January 2013 (BCBS, 2014). 
The disclosure requirements with regard to the leverage ratios are that banks start publishing 
them in 2015.The regulations regarding leverage ratios hold until the final phase-in of the ratios 
in 2019, as for the BASEL Committee is still testing the formulas and will come up with a 
conclusion in 2017 (BCBS, 2014).  
The implementation of the new Accord in South Africa has also been supplemented by the 
introduction of the new twin peaks financial regulatory approach that was developed (as 
mentioned earlier) so as to smoothen the process of introducing a new regulatory framework. 
This approach is called the twin peaks model of financial regulation. The model was developed 
after a 2008 financial regulatory review that was launched by the government in 2007 and then 
scheduled for implementation starting from 2013, the same time that the BASEL III Accord was 
also scheduled for implementation. The idea behind the twin peaks model is to spilt regulation 
such that the financial and the banking sectors have two regulators so as to ensure efficient and 
thorough regulation. The two regulators are prudential and market conduct regulators. The 
objective of the prudential regulator, which will be part of the SARB, will be to maintain the 
soundness and efficiency of the whole financial system (macro-prudential regulation) and as well 
as individual financial institution (micro-prudential regulation). This therefore includes the 
banking and the non-banking institutions, e.g. insurers and other shadow bankers. On the other 
hand, the market regulators will be responsible for the protection of the interests of the 
consumer or the market participants. For example, in the case of banks, the market regulator 
protects the interests of the depositors; this is one of the main reasons why the South African 
government regulates and supervises banks. In the case of shadow bankers and investment 
companies, the market regulator is responsible for the interests of the investor. The market 
regulator is the Financial Services Board (FSB) (National Treasury, 2013: 6).  
South Africa has made considerable progress in implementing of BASEL III and strengthening 
regulation of banks and the financial system. Being a developing country with one of the largest 
financial systems, not only in Africa but the world, there is a great need for success in 
implementing these internationally recognised regulatory standards so as to attract foreign 
investors. A stable financial environment is attractive to investors and would ensure the 
continuous growth of the financial system. The BASEL III regulations help in building this 
stable financial stage; therefore the progress and meeting the deadlines that have been proposed 
is essential and South Africa is in the right path.  
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 3.4.2 Brazil 
Brazil, as mentioned in Section 3.3.2, had originally planned for an early implementation of 
BASEL III but decided to follow the BASEL-given timeline. The government announced in 
2011 that it was intending to implement the full set of proposed regulations through Notice N. 
020 615 that was published by the central bank, Banco de Brazil (BCB). The notice gave banks 
the general regulation outline that had been proposed by the BASEL Committee; the new 
definitions of capital, leverage and liquidity and the calculations of capital, leverage and liquidity 
thereof. These specifics were later published in March 2013 in the form of a set of four 
resolutions (see section 3.3.2) and 15 circulars that detailed the implementation of BASEL III in 
Brazil. These regulations which included the revised capital definitions, calculations of leverage 
ratios and liquidity ratios, capital buffers and as well as risk management requirements were 
scheduled for implementation from October 2013 (BCBS, 2013: 5).  
The calculation of regulatory capital was done through the Prudential Conglomerate 
methodology and was set as a percentage of the total RWA. According to Stuber and Stuber 
(2013), the BCB required banks to follow three established rules with regard to capital disclosure 
and calculations: 
• The 4.5% CET1 would mainly comprise of shares, retained earnings and reserves; 
• Tier 1 capital will be 6% and will be comprised of instruments other than the ones 
mentioned above that would be able to absorb losses as the institution is operating; and 
• Banks would hold a total for 8% equity reference assets and this 8% would be comprised 
of Tier 1 capital and other loss absorbing instruments.  
Instead of specifically stating the countercyclical and the conservation buffers, the BCB required 
banks to hold the additional common equity as the capital buffers as proposed by the BASEL 
Committee. Banks were required to have, by the end of the phase in period, at least 2.5% to 5% 
additional common equity, of the total RWA. The conservation buffer will be phased in as from 
2016 in the manner shown in Table 3.1 below; and banks were also required to adhere to these 
BASEL requirements regarding the timeline on capital buffers (Stuber and Stuber, 2013). 
However, as much as these requirements by the BCB sound close enough to what the BASEL 
Committee proposed, they were found to be strong deviations from the proposed BASEL 
regulations in BCBS report on Brazilian compliance. The RCAP committee realised that with 
regard to the capital and the counter-cyclical buffers, more work had to be done as the 
framework that the BCB had proposed for its banks seemed incomplete (BCBS, 2013: 16).  
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 Table 3.1: Capital structure and BASEL timelines for Brazilian banks 
BCB and 
BASEL 
requirements  
Period of time 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
BASEL CETI 3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 
BCB CET1 *4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 
Basel total 
capital 
8.0% 
 
8.0% 
 
8.0% 
 
8.0% 
 
8.0% 
 
8.0% 
 
8.0% 
 
BCB total 
capital 
*11.0% 
 
11.0% 
 
11.0% 
 
9.875% 
 
9.25% 
 
8.625% 
 
8.0% 
 
Capital buffers ------ ------- ------- 0.623% 1.25% 1.875% 2.5% 
Capital buffer 
Total capital + 
capital buffer 
 
11% 
 
11% 
 
11% 
 
**10.5% 
 
10.5% 
 
10.5% 
 
10.5% 
Source: BCBS (2013: 5); BCB (2013: 24) 
Notes:    * As from the 1st of October 2013 
**Taking into account the regulatory capital deductions 
The BCB was going to start the implementation of BASEL III later than the scheduled timeline 
of January 2013, but put in place accelerated and strict capital regulations that would compensate 
for the lost time and as well as compensate for some regulatory capital that had not been 
deducted. From October 2013, banks were required to hold a minimum Tier 1 common equity 
(CET1) of 4.5% as compared to the 3% that had been proposed by the BASEL Committee, 
while the total capital requirement from 1 October 2013 was 11% compared to the 8% proposed 
by the BASEL Committee. This percentage would gradually fall, up until it gets to the proposed 
8% in 2019 (BCBS, 2013: 5) as shown in the Table 3.1 above. 
The BCB decided that it would follow the proposed regulations that were written by the BASEL 
Committee with regard to the implementation and disclosure of the leverage ratios. They set the 
leverage ratio at 3%. The BASEL Committee would keep evaluating the extent to which the 
proposed 3% level can be effective in trying to avoid the high leverage ratios that caused most 
banks to fail during the 2008 financial crisis. Therefore, the implementation of the leverage ratio, 
not only in Brazil, will be a process throughout the phase to 2017 when the final decision is 
made. The BCB is still set to release the full and finalised requirements regarding the leverage 
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 ratio by the end of 2014 or any time before 2017, so as to give the banks the time they need to 
adjust to these regulations.  
With regard to the liquidity ratio, the BCB also issued a publication making clear its intentions of 
following the proposed calculation, implementation and disclosure requirements that the BASEL 
Committee had put forward for banks to follow. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the liquidity ratio 
was set into two minimum standards, which are the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net 
stable funding ratio (NSFR). The BCB will follow the calculation of the LCR which is the ratio 
between the stock of high quality liquid assets to the net cash outflows for the period of 30 days. 
The ratio should be 100% at all times and will be phased in starting January 2015 to 2019. The 
BCB also mentioned that it will calculate the net cash outflows taking into account the times of 
financial stress. The NSFR was proposed to be calculated as the ratio between the available 
stable funding amount to the required amount of stable funding, which should also be 100% at 
all times. The BCB would also inform banks on the types of assets that would be deemed fit to 
be stable and liquid assets. The NSFR will be implemented as from January 2018. Therefore, 
there is still much to be done on the liquidity ratios before they are due for implementation. The 
BCB is set to finalise the methodologies for calculating the LCR by the end of 2014 and the 
NSFR by the end of 2016 (BCBS, 2013; BCBS, 2014; BCB, 2013).  
As per the BASEL requirements, the circulars that the BCB issued outlining the regulations also 
include the rules regarding exposure and the treatment of risk. The BCB opted not to use 
external credit ratings as proposed by the BASEL Committee and instead decided to use simpler 
methodologies which include the BASEL national discretions. This has, however, been called 
into question by the RCAP Committee which had the concern that, despite the fact that the risk 
weightings proposed by the BCB were higher than those proposed by the BASEL Committee, 
the risk exposures of big domestic banks and large banks that traded internationally would still 
be high. Therefore, instead of using the credit standardised approach to dealing with risk 
exposures, the BCB was urged to adopt the internal ratings based method (BCSB, 2013; Stuber 
and Stuber, 2013). 
The implementation of BASEL III in Brazil has made progress although there are some areas 
that still need to be revisited as recommended in the RCAP reports. These changes include 
making the right capital deductions that need to be made and avoid the over- valuation of 
capital. This may be misleading as banks may end up being vulnerable come times of financial 
stress. Brazil was a bit late in starting the implementation process and despite having made up 
for this with the tight capital rules, there is a great need for the timelines to be followed the way 
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 they were proposed by the BASEL Committee to ensure that the Accord is implemented 
efficiently and there is regulatory alignment between countries, especially those that are sufficient 
trading partners.  
3.4.3 China 
The Chinese banking system is mainly regulated by the CBRC and in 2012 they announced their 
intentions of implementing the new regulatory requirements as from1January 2013. The CBRC 
issued a notice (No. 57) which informed all banks that traded in China that there were to 
implement new capital rules as per the BASEL requirements. The notice required banks to 
calculate consolidated and un-merged capital separately as required by the BASEL regulations. 
These rules were later made clear in 2013 when the CBRC released the finalised capital rules for 
all commercial banks in China. Banks were required to include all the international and domestic 
operations when calculating capital on an unconsolidated basis; therefore the consolidated capital 
calculation would include all the bank’s operations with all the financial institutions that it deals 
with as the CBRC deemed a bank and its financial investors to be one banking group. The notice 
also gave in detail the methodology that would be used to calculate capital adequacy ratio (CAR) 
for the Chinese banks. The CBRC required banks to calculate CAR as follows: 
• Capital adequacy ratio = (total capital –regulatory deductions)/RWA x 100%; 
• Tier 1 CAR = Tier 1 capital –regulatory deductions)/RWA x 100%; and 
• Common equity Tier 1 CAR = common equity Tier 1 capital –regulatory 
deductions)/RWA x 100% (CBRC, 2013). 
The new definition of capital according to the CBRC, which corresponded with the BASEL 
regulations, stated that total regulatory capital would include all common equity Tier 1 capital, 
supplementary Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital. The components of capital were also defined by 
the CBRC to include all the proposed sources and these included common shares, capital, 
general and surplus reserves and as well as any other source that may meet the standards of 
CET1 capital. China also met the regulatory requirements proposed by the BASEL Committee 
and required banks to make the appropriate capital deductions which included goodwill, 
intangible assets and deferred tax. The CBRC, like South Africa, also split its banks into 
systematically important banks (SIBs) and non-systematically important banks (NSIBs). These 
banks were as well required to hold different levels of capital. Once a bank had been identified as 
being a SIB, the CBRC would issue a notice to the bank informing it of the capital requirements 
it was required to adhere to. The systematically important banks were required to hold a 
supplementary regulatory capital of 1% on top of the capital buffer and not lower. This capital 
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 buffer contains both the conservation and the counter cyclical buffers and every bank was 
required to hold these buffers which would range from zero to 2.5% (CBRC, 2013). The 
breakdown for these capital requirements that the Chinese banks were required to hold as the 
1January 2013 were as given in Table 3.2 below. 
Table 3.2: Capital structure and BASEL timelines for Chinese banks 
Capital Minimum capital requirement  Conservation 
buffer 
Counter 
cyclical 
buffer 
Supplemen
tary capital 
for SIBs  Core Tier 1 
capital 
Tier1 
capital 
Total 
capital 
Systematically 
important banks 
5% 6% 8% 2.5% 0-2.5% 1% 
Non-
systematically 
important banks 
 
 
5% 
 
6% 
 
8% 
 
2.5% 
 
0-2.5% 
 
none 
 Source: Shusong and Xiaolong (2013: 4) 
The CBRC required the SIBs to have achieved the proposed capital requirements by the end of 
2013 while the NSIBs were required to have the regulatory capitals before 2019, preferably by 
2016 (Shusong and Xiaolong, 2013: 4; Valladares, 2012). This not only indicated the urgency 
with which the Chinese regulators were willing to implement the new Accord but also showed 
that they were willing to be stricter on these regulations than the BASEL Committee to achieve a 
sound and efficient banking system.  
The CBRC retained the right to monitor and regulate the capital implementation process and 
also the right to change these requirements any time, to ensure that all banks are adequately 
capitalised. Therefore, all banks, domestic or international, trading in China were bound to 
adhere to the rules and regulations that the CBRC had issued which were in accordance with the 
proposed BASEL III requirements.  
Banks in China were not only given new capital rules but new leverage rules to follow as well. 
The CBRC issued a document in 2012 (Rules for the leverage ratio management for commercial 
banks) that gave the general definition of the leverage ratio, the timeline for its implementation, 
its calculation and the disclosure requirements. According to Zou (2012: 48) the CBRC defined 
the leverage ratio as the “ratio between a bank’s Tier 1 capital and its adjusted balance on and off 
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 balance sheet.” The regulations in this document were in line with the proposed BASEL III 
leverage ratio regulations except for the fact that the CBRC set the required leverage ratio for its 
banks at 4% as compared to the 3% proposed by BASEL. The CRBC again maintained the right 
to monitor and regulate the leverage ratio throughout the phase-in period. While the BCBS set 
the implementation of the leverage ratio for 2018, the CBRC required all SIBs within China to 
have adhered to the 4% regulation by the end of 2013 while the NSIBs were required to adhere 
to the same regulations by the end of 2016 (Zou, 2012: 48; Shusong and Xiaolong, 2013).  
To ensure that the leverage ratio is effectively implemented and the regulations followed, the 
CBRC required banks to split their management resources into two sections or parts to cater for 
the ratio. Therefore, according to CBRC (2012), the board of directors of a bank would be 
responsible for the management of the leverage ratio and those responsible for the 
implementation itself are the senior managements of the bank. Banks were also required to 
disclose their consolidated and non-consolidated (through the use of statements to the CBRC) 
leverage ratio levels, on a semi-annual and quarterly basis respectively. These disclosure 
requirements are stricter than those proposed by the BASEL Committee which requires banks 
only to start disclosure by 2018.  
The CBRC also took the importance of liquidity in the banking sector seriously and therefore in 
2013, they issued a document that detailed the reasons for the need to regulate liquidity, the 
assets that would be accepted as high liquid assets, the definition of liquidity risk and its negative 
effects. The CBRC required that the liquidity ratio should take effect on all banks as from 1 
January 2014 and would be phased-in until 2018. Therefore, during the phase-in period, the ratio 
would be 60% in 2014; 70% in 2015; 80% in 2016; and 90% in 2017. The ratio would be 
expected to be 100% in 2018 which is the BASEL deadline. SIBs were required to comply with 
the new liquidity rules by 2013 and the NSIBs in 2016.  
Liquidity management in China under the BASEL III framework would not only include the 
LCR and the NSFR but would also cover the deposit to loan ratio and the liquidity ratio. While 
both the LCR and the NSFR were expected to be 100% under the BASEL rules, the liquidity 
ratio and the loan to deposit ratio (both added by the CBRC) were expected to be above 25% 
and higher than 75% respectively. The liquidity ratio would be calculated as the ratio of the 
amount of liquid assets to the amount of liquid debts multiplied by 100% while the deposit to 
loan ratio would be calculated as the ratio of amount of loans to the amount of deposits, also 
multiplied by 100% (Zou, 2012: 49; Shusong and Xiaolong, 2013). 
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 The Implementation of BASEL III in China has made significant progress compared to many 
countries and the CBRC has also made most of the rules tighter. It may be argued however that 
the tighter rules may make it difficult for the banks in China to implement the BASEL III 
regulations with ease and at low costs. Nevertheless, China has made great strides at attaining a 
sound financial system.  
3.5 A COMPARISON OF IMPLEMENTATION IN SOUTH AFRICA, BRAZIL AND 
CHINA 
Comparing the process of implementation of BASEL III by South Africa, China and Brazil 
would show whether the countries followed the same methods and procedures in implementing 
the new Accord. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that while the BASEL Committee 
proposed the regulatory laws and methods with which the new Accord should be implemented, 
countries could follow different paths to implement the rules. Therefore, implementation 
methods could be different although countries apply the same rules. The difference of 
application methods and laws does not mean that there is no regulatory alignment. Table 3.3 
below shows a comparison of the implementation processes followed by the three countries.  
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 Table 3.3: Summary of results on the extent of and timelines for Basel III 
implementation in Brazil, China and South Africa. 
COMPARISONS  COUNTRIES 
SOUTH AFRICA  BRAZIL CHINA 
Scope of  
implementation  
All banks (D-SIBs 
and G-SIBs) with 
strict rules on the D-
SIBs 
All banks (D-SIBs 
and G-SIBs) with 
strict rules on the D-
SIBs 
All banks (D-SIBs and G-
SIBs) with strict rules on the 
D-SIBs and less strict rules 
for domestic rural banks 
Preparation  
timeline 
2008-2012 2011-2013 2010-2012 
Preparation 
 procedures 
• 2008-
2011(Financial sector 
assessment) 
• 2012 (Twin 
peaks approach 
proposed and 
Directive 5/2012 
stipulating liquidity 
requirements) 
• 2013 
(Directive 2/2013 
with revised liquidity 
requirements and 
Directive 5/2013 
stipulating capital 
rules and timelines) 
• 2011(Notice 
20,615 stipulating 
capital rules and 
timelines) 
• 2012 (Risk 
management 
regulations) 
• 2013 (Final 
resolutions and 
circulars) 
• 2010-2011(Financial 
sector re-assessment) 
• 2012(Notice 57 
stipulating the 
implementation timeline and 
relevant leverage, liquidity 
and capital rules) 
Regulatory  
structures 
• The SARB 
• The BSD 
• The Financial 
Stability Board 
• The bank 
Registrar  
• The BCB 
• The National 
Monetary Council; 
and 
• Brazilian 
Securities and 
Exchanges 
Commission 
• PBoC 
• CBRC 
Final 
implement
ation 
timeline 
• Capital 
• Capital 
buffers 
• Liquidity 
ratios 
• Leverag
e ratios 
1 January 2013 
1 January 2016 
 
1 January 2015 
 
1 January 2013  
1 October 2013 
1 January 2016 
 
1 January 2015 
 
1 October 2013 
 
1 January 2013 
1 January 2016 
 
1 January 2014 
 
1 January 2013 
 
 
Sources: SARB, BCB, CBRC 
3.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A regulatory alignment for the three countries is essential for effective trading. The benefits of 
regulatory alignment among trading partners would be beneficial to the regulated industries by 
avoiding the duplication of trading requirements through the management of product approvals, 
thus making trading costs lower. It is also beneficial to the consumers through lower costs and a 
better regulated system. This allows these countries to grow and attract more investment due to 
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 the stable nature of their regulated industries. Regulatory differences create more trading costs by 
deterring efficient cross border trade and investment. This slows down economic growth and 
also decrease the efficiency of supply chains. Alignment ensures simple and easier movement of 
funds for banks with branches in all the countries and so raising capital and maintenance of the 
banks’ branches becomes less costly. Investment would also rise as a result of the low trading 
costs thus boosting the banking industries in these countries. Since the banking industries hold a 
greater share of the financial sector, their growth would mean the growth of the financial sectors. 
While there are some differences in the implementation procedures all countries plan to 
complete the implementation of BASEL III by 2019 as per the BASEL Committee timeline. As 
Table 3.3 shows, South Africa and China started their implementation preparations earlier than 
Brazil. These two countries also began by assessing their financial sectors before proposing the 
implementation procedures for banks to follow. The assessments were done to evaluate whether 
there was a need for implementation of BASEL III and where it was needed. Despite having 
announced intentions to implement the new Accord early and fast, Brazil lagged behind its two 
counterparts in terms of both preparations and the final implementation. While South Africa and 
Brazil opted to follow the implementation timelines and calculation methods that were given by 
the BASEL Committee for the implementation of the liquidity and the leverage ratios, China 
opted for a stricter approach especially for the leverage ratios that are going to be implemented 
starting from January 2014 instead of 2015.  
The regulatory bodies in the three countries all include their central banks and these, being the 
main regulators, have created other bodies to help in the regulation of banks (In South Africa 
there is the BSD and in China the CBRC). This is with the exception of Brazil in which the BCB 
retains the power to regulate and therefore mainly implement the new Accord. All three 
countries intend on implementing the Accord on all banks and bank groups that trade within 
their respective financial systems. This therefore includes international banks as well. This is 
despite the fact that different capital and other regulatory rules may apply per each bank or bank 
group. Notices and directives have also been the source of communication between the 
regulators and the banks in trying to inform banks about the changes in the regulations that 
govern them. South Africa, Brazil and China are all in compliance with the BASEL regulations 
and despite the differences in the implementation methods, they are all in the same process of 
implementing the new Accord. This shows high regulatory alignment for all these countries 
which is very important as mentioned earlier. The table has also illustrated that the three 
countries are directly comparable in terms of the timelines and the methods used to implement 
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 the BASEL III regulations. The next chapter will compare and analyse the ratio levels (capital, 
leverage and liquidity) in all the three countries.  
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 CHAPTER 4 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CAPITAL ADEQUACY, LEVERAGE AND 
LIQUIDITY RATIOS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The most interesting and main point of focus for the BASEL III Accord is its emphasis on the 
importance of the capital adequacy, leverage and liquidity ratios. It was the notion that the 2008 
financial crisis was caused by low capital levels in the banking system, very high leverage ratios 
and the low and poor quality liquid assets that were also held by the banks. The BASEL 
Committee therefore set out to correct these shortcomings. Therefore, under the new Accord, to 
help with the calculation of capital (as per the two capital tiers), the capital adequacy ratio was 
strengthened; the liquidity ratio was introduced to calculate the ability of a bank to easily turn its 
assets into cash so as to settle its debts; while the leverage ratio was introduced to calculate the 
extent of a bank’s exposure to debt. These ratios were discussed in detail in Chapter 2, but the 
individual country analysis was not done. Individual analysis of the ratios is meant to reveal if the 
process of BASEL III implementation is making any changes to the trends in the capital that the 
banks have been and are now holding. Also, in analysing the ratios for the individual countries, a 
rise in the trends would mean the countries are in compliance with the BASEL Committee 
requirements.  
The introduction of BASEL III has been met with the need for an increase in the capital bases, 
therefore it is expected that the capital trends for these three selected countries would be high to 
show that they are responding to the demands of the new Accord. However, as mentioned in 
Chapter 3, as some countries have since eased up the capital controls while some are following a 
more aggressive approach, it would be no surprise if the trends do not conform to the 
expectations. It is also anticipated that the trends of the liquidity ratio also be high according to 
the present data while leverage would be high signifying low risk.  
There is also the issue of regulatory alignment that the trend analysis is expected to show and as 
pointed out earlier, it is important that this relationship be visible since the countries in question 
are close trading partners. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the importance of regulatory 
alignment, when it comes to trading countries, cannot be overstressed. Chapter 3 showed the 
existence of regulatory alignment in the methods that are being used to implement BASEL III by 
South Africa, Brazil and China. It is also essential to analyse if this alignment does exist in the 
ratios, which are the most important part of the new Accord. Then again, it will not mean that if 
the trends are not the same that there is a lack of alignment. Factors like the aggressive and easy 
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 approaches to the implementation of BASEL III can still play a role in making the trends 
different.  
4.1.1 Data and methodology 
The necessary data on the ratios for the individual banks for the three countries was compiled 
from Bankscope for the period from 2000-2013, with country averages taken for capital 
adequacy. The leverage and liquidity ratios for each country’s banking system as a whole were 
available from Bankscope. However, there is no significant difference between the average and 
the total data as it still represents the banking sectors, for each country, as whole. All ratios were 
then converted to percentages and then graphs for descriptive and comparative analysis were 
plotted. It is also worth mentioning that while it is expected that all banks submit their annual 
reports to Bankscope, some may not do so and this may alter the graphs and thus the analysis to 
some extent. 
While analysing the leverage and the liquidity ratios it is also crucial that one keeps in mind they 
are only going to be fully implemented from 2015 onwards. This means that for the larger part 
of the period under review (2000-2014) banks did not have these ratios or rather did not 
calculate and disclose them the way the new Accord requires them to. This applies in particular 
to the leverage ratio. The leverage ratio used here is not exactly the same as the proposed 
BASEL leverage ratio for banks (which is not yet available), but rather a simple ratio as defined 
below. The purpose is to look for indications of banks progressing in BASEL III 
implementation.  
The trends of the leverage and liquidity ratios, will also be analysed for the period before BASEL 
III. It is for this purpose that they are going to be constructed using data that banks were 
required to disclose during the 2000-2013 period. Since the capital adequacy ratio has always 
been available since the first Accord was proposed, this will be the only ratio that will be looked 
at in full consideration of the BASEL requirements. The BASEL III proposed calculations of the 
leverage and liquidity ratios are discussed in Chapter 2. However, for the purposes of this 
analysis, the equation that will be used to calculate the leverage ratio will represent the 
relationship that exists between equity or Tier 1 capital and a bank’s assets (expressed as a 
percentage), as shown in below: 
Leverage ratio= 𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑/𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇  1 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅 ……………………………………..………………… (5) 
Equation 5 shows that an increase in the leverage ratio for the banks can be viewed as being goo 
although this has to be kept in check as it may be risky as well. As mentioned earlier, the liquidity 
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 ratio equation will represent the relationship between liquid assets and deposits (Dep) and short 
term (ST) funding (expressed as a percentage), as shown in Equation 6 below: 
Liquidity ratio= 𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅
𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚 𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤………………………….……….………… (6) 
The condition that the liquidity ratio should be higher than 100% would still hold. The capital 
adequacy ratio will also be calculated as the average of the capital to asset ratio.  
Analysing the years before BASEL III and comparing them to the years that the Accord was 
proposed would give an insight into whether these ratios are responding to the new proposed 
regulations or not. It would also show if the causes of the 2008 financial crisis, as represented in 
the literature, correspond to the trends in the ratios. Therefore this chapter will analyse, on top 
of the importance of the ratios, the trends in the ratios for South Africa, Brazil and China to also 
see if a conformity conclusion can be reached.  
4.2 CAPITAL ADEQUACY RATIO ANALYSIS 
The first ratio analysis will be the capital adequacy ratio as it is the base point for the other two 
ratios. 
4.2.1 South Africa 
Figure 4.1 below shows the average capital ratio for the South African banking system from 
2000-2013.  
 
Figure 4.1: Average bank capital adequacy ratio in South Africa, 2000-2013 
Data source: Bankscope (2014) 
South Africa is one of the developing countries that survived the full negative impact of the 2008 
financial crisis. One of the reasons this was possible is the fact that South Africa, like many other 
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 countries, had implemented the BASEL Accords (I and II) and was aggressively adhering to the 
capital regulations that came with the Accord. This section will analyse the capital adequacy ratio 
for South African banks from 2000-2013 and Figure 4.1 above shows the average bank capital 
adequacy trend. As the graph shows, prior to 2000 the average capital ratio in South Africa was 
high but started to fall from 2000-2001. By the end of 2001, there was a sharp increase and this 
upward trend continued from 2001-2003. The ratio slightly dropped again as 2003 came to a 
close, only to increase again from 2004-2006. There is a visible severe drop in the ratio between 
2006 and 2007. This is almost like the fall that had been experienced between 2000 and 2001. 
The ratio was then stabilised soon after 2007 and as Figure 4.1 shows, rose from 2007-2012. This 
is the period of the financial crisis and the time that the BASEL III Accord was proposed (which 
will be explained further). However, the trend during periods prior to the 2008 financial crisis 
can be explained otherwise through the use of annual reports released by the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB).  
The SARB had emphasised the need for higher capital adequacy within the banking system as far 
back as 1999 when the second Accord was introduced for implementation not only to the world 
but to the South African system in particular. It is during this time period that the SARB decided 
to be part of the BASEL community which comprises of BASEL member countries as well as 
non-members that choose to follow the banking regulations that the Committee proposed 
(SARB, 1999: 5). This need for more capital that the BASEL Committee called for is reflected in 
the South African capital adequacy trends shown in Figure 4.1above, where there was a high 
average ratio prior to the year 2000. This shows the extent to which the South African banking 
supervision authorities meant to follow the new BASEL regulations and as well as explains the 
high capital ratio trends during this time. 
With the growth of the global financial system, there has been a growth in the innovativeness of 
the banking and financial market players. There was also a rise in the trading of high-risk 
securities and certain capital instruments during the period of 1999-2000. This created the 
knowledge amongst the banks and the financial sector players that arbitrage opportunities existed 
that could be manipulated to maximise profits (SARB, 1999: 6). This was, however, at the 
expense of high quality capital and by the end of the year 2000 the major fall in the average 
capital ratio in the South African banking sector shown in Figure 4.1 proved this point.  
The other reason for the fall in the ratio in 2000(the SARB realised that the value of the banking 
system had been overstated) was because of the over-reliance on collateral security and the cross 
shareholdings (capital double counting) that existed between financial institutions. Therefore, 
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 even when the banks’ books reflected high capital, a revaluation showed otherwise. The 
revaluation then showed the worrying fact that, even though a consensus was reached that banks 
were well capitalised, the general capital levels within the banking system were not satisfactory. 
Therefore to deal with this problem, the SARB set up a regulatory team and required banks to 
report, on a regular basis, their capital structures (SARB, 2000: 14).  
By the end of 2000, the SARB also put up proposals to amend the Banking Act of 1990 and with 
it the capital regulations. This meant an agreed increase in the banking capital structure from 8% 
to 10% in 2001, which was officially approved in February 2001 and was fully implemented in 
October 2001. The increase in the capital levels explains the sharp rise in the ratio from 2001 to 
2003 (SARB, 2001: 71). Although the capital ratio fell as 2003 came to a close, the SARB 
(2004)stated that the South African banking system was not only safe but sound as 99% of the 
registered and operating banks were able to meet the 10% total capital ratio requirement by the 
end of 2004. This period also conforms to the preparations for the implementation of BASEL II 
in South Africa which required banks to hold more capital as a precaution for times of economic 
stress.  
This 10% capital structure was maintained during the BASEL II preparation period and this saw 
the continued rise in the capital levels of the South African banks as shown in Figure 4.1. The 
report also stated that not only had most banks met the requirements but most of them had 
actually surpassed them and had ratios that exceeded 20% (SARB, 2004: 64). The South African 
banking sector was therefore doing very well and was well capitalised, a level maintained during 
the 2005 to 2006 period. 
Despite the fact that Figure 4.1 shows a slight drop in the average capital adequacy ratio, the 
South African banking sector was still sound and well capitalised in 2007. A calculation of the 
percentage change in the capital ratios shows a slight drop of -0.3033%, from the year 2006 to 
the end of 2007. Some may argue that this drop was not really significant as most banks were still 
way above the 10% range that was required by the SARB and the BASEL II Accord. This can be 
explained by the fact that this was the build-up time to the financial crisis and for those banks 
that were international, which had branches in Europe and the United States; the effects of the 
financial crisis were just starting to settle in. While most global banks recorded very low capital 
levels for the period of 2007 to 2008, Figure 4.1 shows slight increases in the capital ratios in the 
South African banking sector. This shows that as most of the European and USA banks went on 
to collapse, the soundness of the South African banking system as a whole was able to absorb 
the shock of the crisis. 
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 By the end of 2008, the average capital-adequacy ratio increased, showing that during the 
financial crisis, capital was well above the required levels, which kept the banking sector as sound 
as it had always been (SARB, 2008: 1). The capital structure in the South African banking system 
is robust enough even though there may be declines here and there. These slight percentage 
changes can be argued to be the anomalies in the data as mentioned before. Figure 4.1 shows the 
slight increase in the capital ratios in South Africa during the time which the SARB announced 
its intentions to incorporate the BASEL III regulations. These regulations, as mentioned earlier, 
came with a higher capital requirement. 
The data analysis has shown part of the reason why the 2008 financial crisis was not felt that 
much by the local banks in South Africa. The strong capital structure of the South African 
banking system has shown that capital is an essential factor in building an efficient and sound 
financial and banking system. However, the financial crisis did slow down economic growth and 
with it the ease with which banks could raise capital. This may be the reason for the slow growth 
in capital levels and also the fall in the average ratios amongst banks as well. However, despite 
these and other problems, the outlook was generally favourable.  
The analysis has also pointed out the existence of the alignment that exists between the 
regulations that are set by the BASEL Committee and those that the SARB requires banks to 
follow. The capital levels in the South African banking system can be seen responding to the 
implementation of the BASEL II Accord and preparations for the implementation of BASEL 
III. This was mostly visible from 2001 and also from 2012 as the SARB implemented BASEL II 
and III respectively and thus required the banks to hold more capital as per the requirements by 
the BASEL Committee.  
Therefore, the SARB has always had capital requirements (for both the domestic and 
international banks trading in the country) higher than the BASEL Committee regulatory 
requirement. This has kept the banking system efficient and sound.  
4.2.2 Brazil 
Brazil is also a one of the many developing countries that implemented the BASEL Accords and, 
because of this, may have also evaded the full wrath of the 2008 financial crisis as well.  
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Figure 4.2: Average bank capital adequacy ratio in Brazil, 2000-2013 
Data source: Bankscope (2014) 
Figure 4.2 shows that the average capital adequacy ratio for Brazilian banks fluctuated a lot 
during the period from 2000-2013. Prior to the year 2000, the ratio was high and then started to 
drop until 2001. It increased from 2001-2005 and as the graph shows, the increasing trends also 
fluctuated as mentioned before. The ratio fell heavily from 2005-2006 and picked up again from 
2006-2007, only to fall again during the financial crisis in 2007-2008. The ratio continued to fall 
until the end of 2009 and then rose slightly in 2010. This is in the period that the BCB 
announced its intentions of early BASEL III implementation. However, the ratio still went on to 
fall again in 2011as the implementation plans were moved to 2013. The end of 2011 saw a rise 
that continued to the end of 2013. 
The average capital ratio of the Brazilian banking system shows the fact that it corresponded well 
to the regulatory requirements of the Accords being implemented by the BCB. There was a 
considerable increase in the capital adequacy ratio from the period of 2001 to 2002 which well 
corresponds with the preparations to the implementation of the BASEL II Accord which the 
BCB had proposed, in 2002, to implement. Prior to this increase, there had been a drop in the 
ratio towards the end of 2000 and as well as 2001. The lowest point of the two was recorded in 
2001 and was blamed on the increased trading of risky assets and a growth in credit operations 
(risk weighted operations) within the banking system. The high volatility that this risky trading 
brought then resulted in the loss of good quality capital that the banks originally held (BCB, 
2002: 39) 
However, with the introduction of the BASEL II regulations, the average capital ratio increased 
considerably towards the end of 2001. This was attributed to the decrease in the credit 
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 operations and risky trading, just as the new Accord had proposed. This growth continued in the 
last quarter of 2001,but despite the increases that were recorded from 2000 to 2001, the average 
capital adequacy ratio started falling yet again towards 2002 to reach another low point in 2003 as 
Figure 4.2above shows. The 2002 financial stability report states that there was a negative 
percentage change of 4.6% in the capital levels as compared to the previous quarter. This decline 
(16.1%-15.1%) was mostly blamed on the privately owned banks in the country. However, 
though this fall was recorded, analysis showed that the majority of the banks in the country still 
had capital levels that were in direct compliance with the required levels, thus showing that the 
fall in the general average capital adequacy ratio did not really pose any major threat to the 
banking system (BCB, 2002: 41). This decreasing trend towards the end of 2002 can be clearly 
noticed in Figure 4.2 above.  
The end of the era of economic instability that had haunted Brazil from the 1990s-2002 (see 
Section 4.3.2) finally came to an end in 2003 and the country enjoyed a spell of confidence in the 
market and so the banking sector also thrived. However, the sound economy turned confidence 
into over- confidence and also raised the levels of securities trading. In 2005, economic growth 
in Brazil was being mainly fuelled by the high development of the financial sector with little 
contributions from the other sectors. It also meant that profit maximisation and financial growth 
now took precedence over capital and the soundness of the banking and the financial sectors. 
This saw the average capital ratio in the Brazilian banking sector fall dramatically from 2005-
2006. Therefore the BCB required that more capital be held, consequently increasing the average 
capital adequacy level (BCB, 2004: 46; Carvalho and Souza, 2011).  
In 2007 the capital adequacy ratio reached its highest level. This meant that all banks were over 
the required 11% limit that had been set by the BCB. It is also worth noting that the BCB had 
taken an aggressive approach to the capital requirement regulations which were way above the 
proposed BASEL level. Therefore the Brazilian banking system was very sound during the 2007 
period which was the build up to the financial crisis. This is also the period that recorded very 
low capital adequacy ratios, low liquidity and high leverage ratios in the European and USA 
banking systems. This increase was explained to have been caused by the retention of the bank 
profits that had been recorded in 2006. Therefore this caused the increase of the total capital 
ratio (tier I and tier II capital) (BCB, 2007; BCB, 2008: 52). However, with the start of 2008, 
there was a drop in the capital ratio, a slight drop that is clearly visible in Figure 4.2. This drop 
was still not as harmful as may have looked as most banks still surpassed the required capital 
standards therefore the banking system was safe from the negative effects of the financial crisis 
(BCB, 2008: 52).  
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 After the crisis there was a revaluation in the capital requirements by the BASEL Committee as 
they proposed the BASEL 2.5 Accord. The Accord stipulated that the financial crisis had 
pointed out the need for more capital and better risk management tools within the banking 
systems globally. Brazil was no exception to these amendments and by the end of the crisis, the 
BCB required that banks increase their capital levels. This then accounted for the slight increase 
in the average capital ratio that had seen a drop towards the end of the 2007-2008 period. This 
was maintained all the way through to 2010 when the BCB announced the country’s plans to 
incorporate the BASEL III regulations into the domestic banking system (BCB, 2010). As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, Brazil had mainly opted to implement the Accord using a more 
aggressive and quick approach but later delayed the implementation process. Banks were 
required to have capital ratios of 11% as compared to the 8% required by the BASEL 
Committee. This therefore accounts for the slight increase in the average ratio between 2011 and 
2012 as shown in Figure 4.2.  
The Brazilian banking system, as the South African banking system, has so far exhibited 
resilience to the negative effects of contagion because of the high capital ratio that the banks 
have maintained. This soundness can also be attributed to the aggressive approach that the BCB 
has when it comes to capital requirements. While most countries have the same or lower levels 
of capital as compared to those required by the BASEL Committee, the BCB makes sure 
domestic banks surpass these requirements. Figure 4.2 shows that Brazil has been implementing 
the BASEL III capital rules.  
4.2.3 China 
Figure 4.3 below shows the average capital adequacy ratio for the Chinese banking system from 
2000-2013.  
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Figure 4.3: Average bank capital adequacy ratio in China, 2000-2013 
Data source: Bankscope (2014) 
Just like the Brazilian banks, the Chinese banking system had a fluctuating average capital 
adequacy ratio, except from 2000-2005. It is also visible from Figure 4.3 that prior to 2000, 
Chinese banks had high capital adequacy ratios but they started falling heavily from 2000-2001. A 
slight increase was recorded from 2001-2002 but it was short lived as there was another fall from 
2002-2003. A high ratio was recorded in 2004 after a high rise from 2003. As in 2002, the 
increase was short lived as a drop can be seen from 2004-2005. From 2005 however, the Chinese 
banking system recorded high increases in capital all the way to 2008 where a slight negative 
percentage change was then recorded from 2008-2009. After the financial crisis, capital ratios 
started to increase again only to fall in 2011and then got stabilised in 2012. 
In trying to analyse the reasons for the capital trends in the Chinese banking system, it is worth 
noting that prior to 2004, Chinese regulations did not require banks to disclose their capital 
ratios. This makes a full analysis of the trends of bank capital ratios in China a challenge as not 
all banks disclosed these ratios. However, during the period of 2000-2003, there is evidence of 
high capital levels in the banking system, despite the slight drops. This is because of the tough 
stand that the Chinese regulatory authorities took on the banks. As most of the banks were state 
owned, there is evidence that the majority of the high recorded capitals were in the state owned 
banks showing the good example that the state was setting for the privately owned banks 
(Molyneuxet.al, 2014).  
The other reason that the Chinese banking sector had considerably high levels of capital during 
this period was because of the incentive to get listed. A listed bank had better business, better 
ownership and better investment opportunities as compared to a non-listed bank. However, to 
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 be listed, a bank would be expected to hold more capital to signify that it was sound. These 
banks would then have a better incentive to maintain this status and value so as to attract more 
depositors and investors and as well as avoid bankruptcy. It was also observed that during this 
period, all state owned banks and approximately three quarters of the privately owned banks, 
were listed suggesting that the levels of capital within the Chinese banking industry were 
normally high as shown in Figure 4.3 (Molyneuxet.al, 2014: 17). 
By the end of 2003, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was formed and it 
announced its intentions to implement the BASEL II banking regulations. The announcement 
came with an adjustment to the amount of capital that the banks were required to hold. Capital 
ratios were to be between 8% and 16% and so banks were required to increase the amount of 
capital that they had. This explains a sharp rise in the average capital ratio as shown in Figure 4.3, 
from 2003-2004. This was also as a result of a capital injection that the Chinese Ministry of 
Finance put into the banks as they had done in 1999 (Sun, 2009).  
This second wave of capital injection was meant to re-capitalise the state owned banks and 
prepare them for the implementation of the BASEL II regulations. The CBRC set a timeline for 
the banks for the implementation of the capital adjustments and expected banks to have a capital 
ratio of over 8% by 2007. Despite the sudden drop in the average capital ratio in 2005, the trend 
that the CBRC had been hoping for was regained in 2006 going onwards as the banks started to 
fully implement the BASEL II capital regulations. This increase was also a result of the third 
wave of capital injections by the Finance Ministry on a quest to make sure that the banking 
sector was sound and fully capitalised. By the end of 2007, the majority of the banks in China 
had met the required capital levels and the capital adequacy ratio had actually increased more 
than they had been expected to (Sun, 2009). This increase in the capital levels can be seen in 
Figure 4.3 by the rise in the average ratio from the period of 2005-2007.  
Not all banks in China escaped the negative effects of the 2008 financial crisis as some came out 
of the crisis with low levels of capital. This slight drop in the levels of these few banks can be 
seen in Figure 4.3 as the average ratio dropped towards 2009. The CBRC reacted by requiring 
that banks raise more capital through selling shares and controlling asset growth. The CBRC also 
made sure that capital regulation of all banks was tight and encouraged them to be less risk 
tolerant by issuing risk alerts to banks (CBRC, 2009: 70). Therefore with the right response from 
the banks, the capital levels rose by the end of 2009 as shown by the slight rise in the average 
ratio in Figure 4.3.  
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 The increase in the capital levels continued into 2010 as a result of the increased number of 
banks that were now able to comply with the required capital requirements. The CBRC 
announced that it would carry on with the implementation of BASEL II in its banking system 
and therefore the 8% capital adequacy requirement was still to be met. By the end of that year, 
the capital adequacy ratios had actually exceeded the required levels and therefore that showed 
that the banking sector was once again sound (CBRC, 2010: 27). Figure 4.3 above clearly shows 
this continued increase in the ratio. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, China made an early announcement of its intentions to incorporate 
the BASEL III banking regulations in its banking system. Therefore in 2011, all banks were 
given the requirements and regulations they had to follow in preparation for the implementation 
of the new Accord. As a result, by the end of 2011, capital levels (as shown in Figure 4.3 above) 
were at their highest. At this point at least 99% of the banks in China were in direct compliance 
with the capital regulatory requirements which also explains the high average capital ratio. By the 
end of 2012 the capital ratios in China were in compliance with the BASEL requirements and the 
country could implement the new Accord with no problems. As China began implementing the 
Accord in 2013, the average capital ratio was low but however were still in compliance with the 
BASEL regulations (CBRC, 2011; CBRC, 2012; CBRC, 2013).  
4.2.4 Capital adequacy ratio comparison 
Now that the capital ratios for the individual countries have been analysed, it is important to 
compare them so as to be able to conclude whether they all follow the same rules and regulations 
and if the trends do show that. For the purposes of the comparison, three periods of interest 
have been demarcated on the graph. The first is the start of BASEL II implementation 
preparations just after 2004, which is also the period that China was preparing to open its capital 
markets. The 2007-2009 period is the time of the financial crisis and the last period is the 
beginning of the BASEL III implementation preparations.  
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Figure 4.4: Average bank capital adequacy ratios, South Africa, Brazil and China, 2000-
2013 
Data source: Bankscope (2014) 
Note: * Start of BASEL II implementation preparations and Chinese capital liberalisation 
        ** Financial crisis 
        *** Start of BASEL III implementation preparations  
Figure 4.4 shows that prior to 2001, all three countries experienced sharp drops in their average 
capital ratios. This could be attributed to the rise in globalisation and as well as the increase in 
the trade of risky securities (see sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2). Profit maximisation took precedence 
over safety and soundness. With globalisation came the need to maximise profits because the 
trade in risky assets brought in higher returns. However, as mentioned earlier, this meant that 
this would leave most banks less capitalised than they should be.  
The graph also shows that Brazil and South Africa have trends that move together more closely, 
despite having a visible mirrored resemblance from 2003-2013 (as the average capital ratio in 
South Africa increased, Brazil’s fell). South Africa also has a mirrored trend relationship with 
China during the same period. The analysis clearly shows that China had a lower capital ratio 
from 2000-2006, as compared to the other two countries. From 2001-2004, it is also visible that 
while Brazil and South Africa had high ratio trends, China’s ratio was low. This is probably 
because, while China was dealing with the effects of the 1990s Asian crisis that saw most of it 
banks have very low ratios, Brazil and South Africa were in their processes of reforming their 
banking sectors and so had slightly higher and increasing capital ratios.  
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 The average capital adequacy ratios for all three countries increased in 2001 as shown in Figure 
4.4. This is despite the fact that China still had a lower ratio as compared to Brazil and South 
Africa. The increasing trends in 2001 can be attributed to the measures that were taken by all 
three countries in limiting the negative effects of globalisation and the rise in risky trading. South 
Africa and Brazil amended the capital rules and also tightened regulations on risk securities 
trading; while China imposed strict capital rules on banks, especially on the state owned.It is 
apparent therefore that China, Brazil and South Africa were affected by the increase in the 
trading of risky assets by banks and therefore they all put up measures to make sure that their 
respective banks would hold enough capital to cover the losses that would come as a result of 
these trades. However, the increase in the average capital adequacy ratio was short lived for 
China as compared to the other two countries.  
By the time the preparations for the implementation of BASEL II started (end of 2003), both 
China and Brazil showed high and increasing average capital ratios that corresponded to and 
were in compliance with the BASEL regulations. However, South Africa had a slight drop in the 
ratio but, as mentioned earlier, this was still in compliance with the BASEL regulations and just 
like its two counterparts, it had a sound banking system. All three countries, despite having 
slightly different trends still followed the same banking regulations and were all in compliance 
with the BASEL II Accord capital regulations. This shows the close relationship that these 
countries have and which, as previously mentioned, is also important for the sake of trade 
amongst them. 
During the BASEL II period to the start of the financial crisis in 2007, Brazil and South Africa 
had fluctuating average capital ratio trends. This is despite the fact that their ratios were still 
higher as compared to China. As mentioned before, this period is also the period that China 
opened up its capital markets which accounted for the fall in the average capital adequacy ratio 
for 2004-2005 (see Section 4.4.3). From 2006 onwards, China started showing signs of increasing 
its average capital ratio towards the levels of South Africa and Brazil. By the start of the financial 
crisis, end of 2007, South Africa and China had stable and rising average capital trends showing 
that they were stable. On the other hand, Brazil’s ratio was falling, but as mentioned in Section 
4.2.2, its banks had capital ratios that exceeded the required levels. Therefore, despite this slight 
drop, showing that it was not fully immune to the effects of the crisis, Brazil still remained sound 
throughout the crisis. 
By the end of 2009 as all three countries were preparing for the implementation of BASEL III 
there is a visible similar movement of their average capital ratios. All three countries announced 
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 that they would implement BASEL III starting in 2013. Therefore, they all began preparations by 
introducing higher capitals for their respective banks. All three took a tighter stance when it 
came to the capital regulations and therefore recorded high average capital ratios. By 2010, the 
average capital adequacy ratios increased, and China recorded the highest ratios in 2011, as 
clearly shown in Figure 4.4. Despite having the lowest capital ratios of the three countries, Brazil 
was still fully complying with the BASEL capital regulations for BASEL III. Capital ratios for the 
three countries converged at the end of 2013 showing they are all in the right track as far as 
BASEL III regulations are concerned as well as indicating regulatory alignment.  
4.3LIQUIDITY RATIO ANALYSIS 
The liquidity of a bank is its ability to meet its obligations efficiently when the need arises and at 
the same time remain sound, functional and solvent. The liquidity ratio is divided into two parts 
which are the LCR and the NSFR (see Chapter 2) and each has its own different calculation that 
the BASEL Committee proposed in the BASEL III documents. However, as a result of limited 
data accessibility, for the purposes of this study, these two ratios will be treated as one and only 
one calculation will be used to calculate the overall liquidity of the banking sectors of the selected 
countries.  
There are many formulae that can be used to calculate liquidity, but for the purposes of this 
study, equation 6 will be used, which shows the percentage of short term debt that a bank can 
meet with its liquid assets in the case that there is a sudden withdrawal or a bank run. Therefore, 
in the event that the ratio is low, it signifies that the bank is vulnerable to bankruptcy in the event 
of a bank crisis. A high liquidity ratio shows that the bank is liquid and can meet the obligations 
of its creditors and still remain sound and operational. The next sections will look, in detail, at 
the liquidity trends in South Africa, Brazil and China by matching them with the financial 
stability and annual reports that the respective central banks have disclosed. This would help 
analyse the reasons for these trends and if they match with the BASEL Accords implementation 
periods.   
4.3.1 South Africa 
The overall liquidity ratio for the South African banking system is shown in Figure 4.5 below. 
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Figure 4.5: Overall bank liquidity ratio in South Africa, 2000-2013 
Data source: Bankscope (2014) 
Figure 4.5 shows the liquidity trend in the South African banking system from 2000-2013. As 
from 2000 there is a visible increase in the trend. This rise continued from 2000-2002 and then 
bank liquidity fell heavily from 2002 to 2003. As the graph shows, this was the biggest drop 
during the sample period. However, the liquidity pressures were dealt with and from 2003-2005 
there was a sharp increase in the liquidity ratio as shown in Figure 4.5 above. After 2005, liquidity 
was maintained at a stable trend until 2009, although the ratio did fluctuate here and there. In 
2010, there was yet another sharp increase which took it to the highest point it had ever been 
during the sample period. Despite the fall from 2011-2012, the ratio was stabilised through 2013. 
The reasons for these trends can be explained using the financial and banking annual reports 
released by the SARB. 
The year 1999 was marked by a liquidity crisis within the banking sector. This period also had 
records of high interest rates and unfavourable business conditions. However, despite the 
improvements in economic growth and strides that had been made in lowering government debt, 
the lagging effects of the high interest rates resulted in the failures of many business and big 
corporates. This was a huge blow to the banking sector as this meant that most of the loans that 
they had granted would be defaulted or would be close to default; and these are defined as non-
performing loans (SARB, 1999).  
The growth in these non-performing loans was very high during this time and this caused 
liquidity pressures on the banks. Considering that loans are regarded as asset exposures by the 
BASEL Committee, this meant that the banks now had high exposures as compared to the 
amount of liquid assets that they were holding at that point in time. This resulted in the low 
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 levels of liquidity that the banking sector reported prior to the year 2000 (SARB, 1999). This 
trend is clearly visible in Figure 4.5. 
These liquidity pressures, which had mainly originated among the smaller banks and had affected 
them the most, had to be dealt with. Therefore, the SARB amended the liquidity requirements 
and required that banks hold a higher percentage of liquid assets in their books at all times. 
Through the Bank Supervision Department (BSD), the SARB made sure that banks made daily 
reports of their liquidity levels and where necessary, the BSD would even require that major 
shareholders of a bank inject more capital into the bank (SARB, 1999). 
This was effective in driving up the liquidity levels as Figure 4.5 clearly shows a steady rise of the 
liquidity ratio from the year 2000 going further. The SARB, in 2000, then began the liquidity 
facility program (system of accommodation) for banks in a bid to make sure that banks were 
always fully covered in the event of a banking crisis. The liquidity facility operates under the repo 
rate and a cash requirement that the SARB ensures is always adhered to. The major details of 
how the system of accommodation works will not be dealt with here, that the main point is that 
the accommodation system is the other reason for the increase in liquidity from 2000-2002 
(SARB, 2000; SARB, 2001).  
South Africa had a major currency crisis in the 1990s which saw the Rand depreciating incredibly 
and this seemed to have been dealt with and liquidity was rising again, the end of 2002 saw 
another currency crisis hitting South Africa and this time it had a huge negative impact on bank 
liquidity (CPLO, 2002). Figure 4.5clearly shows this decline in bank liquidity. The SARB, 
through the monetary policy committee put in measures to combat the problems that had been 
brought about by the depreciation of the Rand. Therefore the liquidity problems were also 
managed so as to ensure the continued soundness of the financial sector. The SARB maintained 
the liquidity requirements as well as the system of accommodation, which again proved to be 
effective in bringing back liquidity levels to where they had to be (SARB, 2003). The rising trend 
of the liquidity ratio in Figure 4.5,from 2003-2005,clearly backs up this argument.  
In 2006, the liquidity situation in the banking system was still stable and improving. The amount 
of liquid assets that the banking sector held by the end of that year signified 112% of the 
required liquid assets, which was still high despite a slight fall from 119% in 2005(SARB, 
2006).Also, the amount of non-performing loans during that year had fallen considerably and 
therefore this meant that the banks were not only performing efficiently but were sound and 
making profits. This however did not mean that the SARB stopped implementing additional 
measures to maintain and improve the liquidity situation in the banking sector. Supervisors were 
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 requested to always ensure that banks had sufficient and high quality liquid assets and as well as 
liquid management systems to deal with liquidity issues (SARB, 2006).  
The year 2007 marked the beginning of the financial crisis and South Africa was not entirely 
immune to the effects of the global financial turmoil. The increase in the trade of risky securities 
by banks and financial institutions and as well as the unwillingness of international investors to 
invest because of the fear of the unstable market, all resulted in the fall of the global liquidity 
levels. Although South Africa reported that the liquid assets that the banks had in 2007 exceeded 
the required levels, there was a recorded drop in overall liquidity ratio which decreased from 
2007-2009 as seen in Figure 4.5. This was caused by the increase in the deposits and short term 
funding during that period, which meant the even when banks were improving their liquid assets, 
the liquidity ratio kept falling (Mabwe and Webb, 2010: 42).  
The BASEL Committee of banking supervision then introduced the liquidity ratio to monitor 
the liquidity levels in the banking systems and as well as reminding banks when there was the 
need to improve on liquidity. Banks were required to hold high quality liquid assets that would 
offset the increase in the deposits and short term funding. By the end of 2009 when South Africa 
announced its intentions of implementing BASEL III, the banks were already on track in 
improving the liquidity situations in their books. This resulted in the recorded high increase in 
the liquidity ratio from 2010 as Figure 4.5shows. Despite the fall in the liquidity ratio in 2011, the 
South African banking system has been sound liquidity-wise. Since the beginning of 2013, 
implementation of BASEL III has meant that liquidity levels are stable and on the right track to 
reach 100% as required. The liquidity ratio as required by BASEL III was discussed in full in 
Chapter 2.  
4.3.2 Brazil 
The overall liquidity ratio for the Brazilian banking system is shown in Figure 4.6 below. 
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 Figure 4.6: Overall bank liquidity ratio in Brazil, 2000-2013 
Data source: Bankscope (2014) 
Just like South Africa, as the year 2000 approached, an increase in the liquidity ratio can be 
seen.It was short lived as by the end of that same year, the ratio started to fall. The drop lasted 
from the end of 2000-2002. Liquidity pressures in the banking system seemed to have been fixed 
by the beginning of 2003 but as 2004 came to an end, there was a sharp fall of the liquidity ratio. 
The fall lasted the whole year of 2005 and then liquidity was revived in 2006. The fluctuations 
continued all the way through the 2008 financial crisis to the end of the sample period, 2013. 
According to Moore (2007), during the 1990s there were more than sixteen banking crises that 
hit the Latin American countries and Brazil was not immune to the effects that these crises 
brought. As the liquidity trend in Figure 4.6shows, prior to the year 2000, the liquidity ratio was 
low. On top of the currency crisis (see Section 4.2.2), the banking crises in the Latin American 
countries may also have contributed to or may have been caused by the evident liquidity loss. It 
is well apparent, as mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, that one of the many contributors to; and 
effects of a banking crisis is the loss of liquidity and this can well explain the low trend prior to 
2000 shown in Figure 4.6. 
Brazil went through a currency crisis in the late 1990s which contributed to the low banking 
activity. As a result of this, the government introduced measures that would deal with bringing 
the economy back on track. With the economy stable again, the banking sector would also 
perform efficiently. According to Amanteet.al (2007), these policy reforms that the government 
took made the economy and as well as the banking sector better. Therefore, an improved 
economy meant boosted investor confidence and therefore the lack of liquidity would be limited. 
This fully explains the increase in the liquidity ratio from 2000-2001. 
The end of 2001 saw the beginning of a balance of payments crisis in Brazil, which was also 
fuelled by the unstable political environment in the country at that time. Although the impact of 
this crisis was minimal as compared to the effects of the crisis in 2001, it left a slight negative 
dent on the banking system. This type of environment, which is associated with high interest 
rates, high inflation and government defaults, repels potential investors and causes existing 
investors to disinvest from the country which results in a high capital outflow (Carvalho and 
Souza, 2011). The negative effects on the economy that were caused by these issues can explain 
the fall in the liquidity ratio from the end of 2001 reaching a low point in 2002, a trend clearly 
seen in Figure 4.6.  
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 Although much literature states that contagion from the Argentine balance of payments crisis 
was the major reason for the economic meltdown that happened in Brazil, the political issues 
that had been raging on in the country since the end of the 20th century also helped to fuel the 
2002 problem. Therefore as soon as the crisis in Argentina was fixed with the help of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) as 2002 came to an end, it meant that there was more room 
for the Brazilian government to be flexible and try to fix the internal problems that were facing 
the country. The stable political environment proved to be a success as it resulted in a stable 
economy, which ultimately attracted investors and restored market confidence Tedesco Lins 
(2011: 77). This healthy environment, which was maintained all the way to the end of 2004, 
meant that the liquidity ratiowould be high, as clearly shown in Figure 4.6.  
With the economy starting to take greater shape since the 1990s-2002 crises, confidence turned 
into over confidence for the financial sector and the banks as well. As mentioned before, the 
Brazilian economy was mostly being financed by the strong and accelerated growth in the 
financial sector. This meant that, as 2005 approached, the rise in the trade in risky securities and 
the prioritisation of profit maximisation over soundness and safety; meant banks were willing to 
forgo safe liquidity and capital levels (for capital levels see Section 4.2.2). This resulted in the 
drastic fall of the liquidity ratio from 2004-2005, a trend clearly visible in Figure 4.6above 
(Carvalho and Souza, 2011: 27).  
Brazil still enjoyed the benefits of a stable economy and with the implementation of BASEL II 
the banking sector was stable and sound as compared to most developing countries. Tighter 
bank regulations by the BCB increased capital and liquidity ratios again in 2006-2007. 2007 was 
the beginning of the global financial crisis and as much as the Brazilian economy and financial 
sectors were sound, the country was not fully immune to the effects of contagion again. The end 
of 2007 saw a drop in the liquidity ratio, a trend that was maintained until the end of 2008. Some 
analysts mention that the implementation of BASEL II helped Brazil to pull through the 
financial crisis with less harm done to its banking sector as compared to other countries that had 
not adopted the regulatory principles (Janotet.al. 2008).  
This might be true as the liquidity ratio remained high and steady throughout the financial crisis, 
which lasted to 2009 and even 2010 for some countries. The trend in Figure 4.6also shows the 
increase of the ratio in 2011, right when the BCB announced that the principles of the BASEL 
III Accord would be introduced to the Brazilian banking sector. Although full implementation of 
the liquidity ratio will only be in 2015, countries like Brazil who have begun the implementation 
of BASEL III have had their banks raise the liquidity ratio gradually since 2011. This is so that 
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 the ratio be 100% by 2015 (as required by the BASEL Committee). It also explains the high to 
normal liquidity ratio trend from 2011 to the end of 2013 as shown in Figure 4.6. The Brazilian 
banking sector is on the right track in the implementation of the liquidity ratios that are required 
by BASEL. 
4.3.3 China 
The overall liquidity ratio for the Chinese banking system is shown in Figure 4.7below. 
 
Figure 4.7: Overall bank liquidity ratio in China, 2000-2013 
Data source: Bankscope (2014) 
China’s liquidity ratio trend was in a falling state prior to the year 2000. The fall in the ratio 
almost picked up in 2001 but continued to fall to mid-2002. It was revived from mid-2002 but 
this was not for long as mid-2003 the liquidity ratio started falling again. This can been seen to be 
the trend all the way to mid-2006. However, China had a high liquidity ratio in their banking 
system during the build up to the financial crisis, as the graph shows a sharp rise from 2007 to 
2008. However, they were not fully immune to the crisis as the liquidity ratio fell during the crisis 
to 2009 only to be revived and stabilised thereafter. As the CBRC was preparing banks for 
BASEL III implementation in 2010, there was a visible increase in the liquidity ratio as well. This 
continued up to 2012 and then there was a slight dip towards 2013. The explanations for these 
trends will thus be discussed below.  
China was a closed economy (government was in control of the banks and financial sector) up 
until the 20th century when it decided to liberate its capital and financial accounts and so it 
became a part of the global economy. This meant that liquidity in the Chinese banking sector 
(1990s-2002) was not measured according to the amount of liquid assets the banks held or the 
amount of loans they issued but rather mainly according to the reserve requirements that would 
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 be set by the People’s Bank of China (PBoC). Also, the Chinese currency was not yet being 
traded internationally, securities trading was still in the premature stages and the banks were only 
in there to serve as deposit holders. Banks would only give out loans to enterprises under the 
direct and monitored request or orders from the state, meaning that there were no individual 
loans. (Gottschang, 2001: 5).  
As a part of its economic and banking reform, the government made capital injections into the 
State Owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs). The Chinese SOCBs are the largest banks in China 
and therefore in a way, their performance is crucial to the whole industry and also reflects the 
performance of the whole industry. From the late 1990s-2002, the reform phases included the 
lowering of the bank reserve requirements from 13%-8% which freed up a large amount of 
liquidity in SOCBs and the banking sector (Okazaki, 2007: 20). This therefore explains the sharp 
drop in the liquidity ratio from 2000-2002 as shown in Figure 4.7above.  
In 2002, the PBoC also lowered liquidity reserve requirements for the banks as well as having the 
non-performing loans that the banks had in their books be written off. The SOCBs had the 
highest levels of non-performing loans and therefore the decision to right the loans off were 
made to ensure that the four big banks would remain efficient and sound. Non-performing 
loans, as mentioned in Section 4.3.1, can result in liquidity pressures for banks and therefore can 
consequently result in low bank liquidity (Bihong, 2006). Though this would not be the last time 
non-performing loans would be written off for banks, it did prove to be successful in 2002 as the 
liquidity ratio improved from 2002-2003, as Figure 4.7shows. 
By the end of 2003, the Chinese government realised that the banks were not making enough 
profits from issuing loans as much as they should have been. Therefore, despite the need for a 
low level of non-performing loans and low banking risk, the PBoC relaxed the laws that 
governed banks’ abilities to lend by cancelling the lending rates ceiling and as well as the floor for 
deposit rates. This meant that banks were now free to lend to the general public as well. This 
also meant that the level of risk that the banks were now facing had been increased as well as the 
prospective level of non-performing loans (Okazaki, 2007). As a result of the profit 
maximisation approach, bank liquidity was sacrificed along the way. This clearly explains the fall 
in the liquidity ratio from 2003-2004as shown in Figure 4.7. However, the ratio went up again 
from 2004-2005 as the non-performing loans in the SOCBs were cancelled again (Bihong 2006: 
138). This trend can be seen in Figure 4.7 above. 
The final phases of the Chinese financial reform came end of 2005 when the government 
opened the banking sector for foreign banks. This move was meant to increase competition as 
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 the foreign banks would challenge the domestic banks on a business standpoint, thus also 
improving the soundness and effectiveness of operations within the banking sector. However, it 
also meant that the level of risk in the banking sector would rise as the amount of loans that 
were being given out would also increase (Bihong, 2006). The high rate of competition meant 
that banks would now forgo safety (capital and liquidity) for profit maximisation and market 
dominance. It also resulted in the growth of shadow banking in China, which is the risky off-
balance sheet trading and lending done by banks (Dang et.al, 2014). This considerably affected 
the levels of liquidity, which explains the negative trend in the ratio from 2005-2006 as shown in 
Figure 4.7. 
 Despite the negative effects that capital liberalisation had caused, it is also important to note that 
the increase in competition and bank activity meant there would be a need for better market 
regulation, better corporate governance, corruption management and as well as transparency 
laws. The CBRC then tightened the regulation on lending, deposit rates, shadow banking and 
required banks to hold more capital and required reserves (Bihong, 2006). This resulted in the 
rise ofthe liquidity ratio from the end of 2006-2008 as shown in Figure 4.7. Tight CBRC bank 
regulations were credited for taking the banking sector through the 2008 financial crisis.  
However, the sector was not entirely immune to the crisis partly because of the foreign banks 
that were trading in the country, while contagion played a role in bringing the liquidity ratio 
down as well. This explains the fall of the ratio, as shown in Figure 4.7,from 2008-2009. Liquidity 
pressures were stabilised after the crisis and end of 2010 the CBRC announced China’s 
intentions to implement BASEL III. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Chinese banks went through a 
process of preparatory phases for the implementation of the accord and this included raising the 
liquidity ratio so as to meet the 2015 regulations set by the BASEL Committee. This explains the 
increase in liquidity from 2010-2012 seen in Figure 4.7. Despite a reported liquidity crisis in the 
Chinese banking sector in 2013, the country is on track to achieve the BASEL set targets by 
2015.  
4.3.4 Liquidity ratio comparison 
Figure 4.8below shows the comparison of liquidity ratios for South Africa, Brazil and China 
during the period of 2000-2013. As mentioned before, it is essential to do a comparison of the 
liquidity ratios of all the three countries so as to establish if all are in the same track to achieve 
the BASEL set targets. As in Section 4.2.4, three areas of interest have also been depicted on the 
graph to help with the analysis.  
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Figure 4.8:Overall liquidity ratios, South Africa, Brazil and China, 2000-2013 
Data source: Bankscope (2014) 
Note: * Start of BASEL II implementation preparations and Chinese capital liberalisation 
        ** Financial crisis 
        *** Start of BASEL III implementation preparations 
Of the three countries, Brazil seems to have the highest levels of liquidity. The liquidity ratio 
trend in Brazil, however high was more volatile as compared to South African and Chinese 
trends. The high liquidity ratio trend in Brazil, as mentioned in section 4.3.2, is as a result of the 
tighter regulations that are imposed on the banks in Brazil by the BCB. Generally, South Africa 
and China showed stable liquidity ratio trends during the sample period, especially from 2005-
2010.  
Prior to 2000, Brazil and South Africa had low liquidity ratios as compared to China, as Figure 
4.8 shows that their trends were in a state of recovery. This is because in the late 1990s, Brazil 
and South Africa experienced moments of low liquidity as both countries experienced currency 
crises during this period. Brazil was also going through the phases of its economic reform and 
was unfortunate that there were plenty of banking crises that affected the banking sector during 
this time. In South Africa on the other hand, recovery from the high government debt and the 
after effects of Apartheid meant that the banking sector was not as sound as it should have been.  
End of 2002, the liquidity ratios in Brazil and China increased, while South Africa’s liquidity fell. 
This is despite the fact that economic issues that were affecting Brazil and South Africa were the 
same as compared to those of China. Therefore one would have expected the trends in South 
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 Africa and Brazil to be more or like the same. However, as all countries started the preparations 
for the implementation of BASEL II, there were increases in the liquidity ratio trends from 2003. 
This was especially for South Africa and China whose trends, as mentions earlier, corresponded 
more. Brazil had a stable liquidity ratio trend during the preparatory period as compared to the 
rising trends of South Africa and China. During the BASEL II period, Brazil and China 
exhibited falling liquidity ratio trends as compared to South Africa. It is worth mentioning that 
the fall in the liquidity ratio in China during the BASEL II period was as a result of capital 
liberalisation while in Brazil it was the rise in the trading of risk securities. These reasons for the 
fall in the liquidity ratios in Brazil and China are generally related. During this period, the 
liquidity ratio in South Africa had increased and stabilised as the financial crisis build up came 
close.  
Brazil and China fixed the liquidity problems in their respective banking sectors at the end of 
2006. During the financial crisis period, as shown in Figure 4.8, all three countries had stable 
liquidity ratios, therefore were sound and not vulnerable to the bankruptcy as the crisis 
worsened. These stable ratio trends can be attributed to the full implementation of the BASLE II 
Accord by the South Africa, Brazil and China in an effort to meet the international regulatory 
standards. Despite the fact the levels of “shadow banking” in China and risky securities’ trading 
in Brazil had increased considerably since 2005, the tight capital rules that came with the 
implementation of BASEL II helped keep the banking systems liquid and safe.  
All countries had increased liquidity ratios after 2010, especially South Africa and China who 
started implementation preparations of BASEL III sooner that Brazil. As mentioned in Chapter 
3, although Brazil announced an early implementation plan, they only started preparation late 
2011. All countries do show that they are on the right track to reaching the 2015 set targets by 
the BASEL Committee as Figure 4.8 shows they all had the same trends of liquidity ratios after 
2010. 
4.4 LEVERAGE RATIO ANALYSIS 
The final part of the ratio analysis deals with the controversial and complicated leverage ratio. 
This ratio, despite the fact that it had existed all along and banks would only use it when they 
thought it was necessary for reducing systematic risk, was only formally introduced as part of the 
BASEL III package in 2010 and has been the topic of debate between the banks and the BASEL 
Committee. The definition of leverage, though looked at in previous chapters, has to be fully 
defined again for the purposes of the analysis. The term leverage is used in so many contexts and 
applies to each differently. According to the SARB (2011: 38), “In essence, leverage refers to the 
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 funding of assets and investments by typically borrowing money.” Therefore as mentioned in 
Chapter 2, as much as a high leverage may mean more profits for a bank, it also means it is 
highly exposed (to debt) and would have its equity wiped out in the event that the returns from 
the leveraged investments are low and loans are defaulted. This was the case that fuelled the 
2008 financial crisis and so the BASEL Committee proposed that banks have a minimum 
leverage ratio of 3% (SARB, 2011). Banks are therefore encouraged not to finance their equity 
with debt to more than this required level (National Treasury, 2011: 18). 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the leverage ratio will only be fully implemented in 2018 when the 
disclosure requirements take effect. However, preliminary implementation already started in 2013 
and all banks are expected to have achieved the set levels by 2017. This basically means that, for 
this ratio analysis, during the period prior to 2013 the leverage ratio was not binding as it had not 
yet been proposed as a regulatory tool. This, however, does not mean that the ratio did not exist. 
As mentioned earlier, banks would use it at their own discretion so as to limit the effects of 
systematic risk. Analysis of the trends will look at how important the ratio has been to the banks 
as well as if they are any closer to reaching the set targets for 2018.  
The basis of the analysis will be on the reasons why the leverage ratio changes to begin with. 
Since the disclosure of the leverage ratios will only be mandatory in 2018, it means the period 
prior to the introduction of BASEL III, banks had not been disclosing their leverage ratios or 
had not been calculating them at all. It is important then to look at the components that make up 
the leverage ratio (as per Equation5) as these components contribute to the movements shown 
in the figures below. Considering the leverage ratio is calculated using Equation 2 (according to 
BASEL) and Equation 5 (in general),Ozcanet.al. (2012: 12) states that, the increase in the value of 
the assets would subsequently increase both the numerator and the denominator; but equity 
increases by a larger proportion as compared to assets. In such a case, it would mean that the 
leverage ratio would still be low posing no exposure problems to the banks.  
However, Ozcanet.al (2012: 12) goes on to mention that, during the 2008 financial crisis, banks 
would now use this increased equity to also increase lending, which would meant they now had a 
larger proportion of increased assets in the form of loans. These assets (loans) are what the 
BASEL Committee deemed as the exposure measure and by increasing their assets in this 
manner it means that the growth in assets was not inversely related to leverage anymore. 
Therefore an increase in assets through a growth in loans would significantly decrease the 
leverage ratio, as according to Equation 5. It is also important to note that an increase in loans 
and advances by banks and the financial institutions would mean increased economic activity and 
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 growth, but also means that banks would now be more exposed than they had been before the 
increase in the loans and advances. Therefore as much as this trend might be good for the 
economy, it brings more risks to the banking sector in times of unexpected financial stress 
because of defaults.  
To analyse the trends before BASEL III came into existence, the text will focus on the growth in 
banks’ assets and loans from 2000-2013. Constant references will be made to Section 4.2 as 
capital/equity is one of the leverage components. This would give a better view as to how 
leverage moved during the period that was not regulated with the leverage ratio as according to 
BASEL III. This approach has been chosen to compensate for the lack of necessary reporting 
on the leverage ratio by banks under the sample period. This consequently makes analysis of the 
leverage ratios different from the analyses of the capital adequacy and liquidity ratios. 
4.4.1 South Africa 
In Figure 4.9 below, the leverage ratio trend in the South African banking system is depicted.  
 
 
Figure 4.9: Overall bank leverage ratioin South Africa, 2000-2013 
Data source: Bankscope (2014) 
Figure 4.9 shows that bank leverage ratio in South Africa during the sample period has been 
relatively high. This clarifies the point made in the previous sections, which have shown the 
banking system to be sound and rather effective. As the year 2000 started, the leverage ratio 
wasfalling and this trend continued until the end of 2003. After that the ratio started rising 
gradually, first by a small percentage in 2004 and then sharply in 2005. Reasons for this trend will 
be fully discussed below. The leverage ratio fell from 2005 to end of 2008 and then rose sharply 
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 again during the peak of the financial crisis. This rising trend did not stop until the end of 2012 
when it was finally stabilised. This timeline corresponds well with the implementation of BASEL 
III in South Africa. To analyse these trends in the leverage ratio in the South African banking 
system from 2000-2013, annual reports released by the SARB will be used to provide additional 
information. 
The SARB (2000) states that there was an increase in the value of assets from 1999-2000. This 
increase came by as market and consumer confidence were revived after the currency crisis (see 
Sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.1). An increase in the value of assets, as mentioned earlier, would have 
meant an increase in the value of capital and there was surely an increase in the capital ratio in 
the year 2000 as can be seen in Figure 4.1. Therefore, the increase in both capital and assets’ 
value in 2000 meant that the leverage ratio would have been low or in a decreasing mode as 
compared to the previous years. This decline was also facilitated by the fact that, even with the 
growth in assets and equity, banks did not increase their total lending. There was no change in 
the loans and advances sections, which remained fairly unchanged (SARB, 2000). This therefore 
reduced the amount of exposure to the banks and so in turn reduced the leverage ratio as clearly 
shown in Figure 4.9.  
According to the SARB (2001: 45), in 2001, bank assets increased by R226.3 billion which is at 
least a 27.6% growth rate, as compared to the value of 2000. This is almost double the growth of 
the previous year, which meant that there was also a major increase in the capital that banks held 
by the end of 2001 (SARB, 2001). This much increase in capital and assets would have given 
banks the much needed confidence to increase public lending, but this was not the case. 
Although there was a slight growth in loans in 2001 it was only of the smaller components of the 
loans and advances category. The major parts of this class, which included mortgage loans and 
overdrafts and other loans, rather decreased and by the end of the year 2001 there was an overall 
negative increase in the loans that banks had given out (SARB, 2001: 45). This therefore meant 
that exposure remained low and so the leverage ratio continued to fall. This trend can clearly be 
seen in Figure4.9 above as it continues until end of 2003.  
The end of 2003 however brought a slight turn around in the bank trends in South Africa. 
According to SARB (2003: 45), assets increased in value as usual, as per the previous years, but 
the slight difference with the growth in 2003 is that it was slightly negative as compared to the 
previous year. Assets grew by 25.2% in 2003 as compared to the 27.6% in 2002. As shown in 
Figure 4.1, there was a significant drop in the capital ratio from 2003-2004, which meant that an 
increase in loans would have increased exposure and leverage consequently. This is was the case 
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 in 2003 as by the end of the year loans and advances had increased by 11.3% as compared to 
10% the previous year (SARB, 2003). Figure 4.9shows the slight increase in the leverage ratio 
from 2003 to 2004 that came as a result of the above-mentioned loan increases.  
Asset values, for a consecutive year, recorded a negative increase in 2004. According to SARB 
(2004: 61), assets increased by R118.3 billion in 2004 which is an 8.6% growth rate. Compared to 
the 25.2% growth in 2003, one could look at this as being a significant fall in the value of assets 
during 2004. The 2004 annual report also mentions that there was a major fall in asset values the 
first half of 2004, which could also be the contributing effect to the slight drop in capital 
adequacy ratio during that year as was shown in Figure 4.1. In such a case, it would have been 
wise for banks not to increase the amount of exposure, through loans, so that they stay sound. 
However, despite the fall in asset values, loans and advances increased during 2004 having grown 
from 8.1% in June that year to 11.2% by December that same year (SARB, 2004: 62). What this 
meant was that with the fall in capital and value of assets, an increase in loans and advances 
would also increase the level of banks’ exposure; thus raising the level of the leverage ratio as 
well. This rise can be clearly seen in Figure 4.9 from 2004-2005.  
Banks improved their asset value holdings in 2005 as assets increased by a value of R179.1 
billion, a 12% growth rate as compared to the 8.6% the previous year (SARB, 2005). This 
significant increase in the value of assets duly put the banks in a better position to weather any 
risky storms that were to come their way. As anticipated, banks did increase their lending as 
loans and advances increased by a higher margin in 2005 as compared to 2004. Despite this high 
increase in loans and advances, exposure on the banks did not really show while the leverage 
ratio fell as shown in Figure 4.9 above. This might be attributed to the strict capital rules that the 
banks were under and the considerable growth in asset values. This fall in the ratio continued all 
the way to the beginning of 2008, the financial crisis.  
Although banks’ assets increased in 2007, this is the year of the housing bubble and therefore the 
growth in loans and advances was also soaring. This growth was mainly fuelled by the rise in the 
increase in the mortgage loans and overdrafts and loans (SARB, 2007: 67). According to SARB 
(2008), there was also an increase in the loans that banks issued on resale agreements as well as 
credit card debtors. This increased exposure required that banks have more than enough capital 
cushion to cover them during the times of financial stress, but with the small growth in capital 
meant that leverage would be very high which explains the sharp increase in the leverage ratio as 
shown in Figure 4.9. To add up to this, the rate of risky trading had also gone up globally and 
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 South Africa was no stranger to this as well. This growth in risky trading also contributed to the 
leverage ratio spiking up from 2008-2009.  
The leverage ratio has since been under check ever since the South African government 
announced that the BASEL III regulations will be implemented. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 
South Africa has requested domestic and foreign banks to have a minimum leverage ratio of 4% 
as compared to the BASEL mandated minimum 3%. This was enforced since 2013 despite the 
fact that the final implementation will be in 2018. Therefore banks have been adjusting to 
accommodate the new rules. By the end of 2014, an analysis of some of the big banks in South 
Africa revealed that the bank with the highest leverage ratio was Nedbank with 8.5%, ABSA had 
8%, Standard Bank 7.1% while FirstRand Bank had 7% (KPMG, 2014). Figure 4.9 clearly shows 
the leverage ratio trend continuing to increase at the end of 2013 showing that South African 
banks are on the right track to achieve the government and BASEL set targets.  
4.4.2 Brazil 
The leverage ratio in Brazil from 2000-2013 is shown in Figure 4.10 below. It has been 
fluctuating and just like South Africa, high as well. The ratio increased at the start of the year 
2000-2001 and fell briefly until mid-2002 before rising sharply again until the end of 2006. The 
ratio thendropped in 2007 as the financial crisis was building up but this was short lived as it 
increased again from 2008-2010. Thereafter it decreased and was stabilised in 2013. This last 
trend from 2010 corresponds with the preparations and actual implementation of the BASEL III 
Accord in Brazil. In analysing the reasons for this trend in the leverage ratio, it will be evident 
that the capital and liquidity trends that were dealt with in Sections 4.2.2 and 4.3.2, respectively, 
willmove more like the leverage ratio trends in most cases.  
 
Figure 4.10: Overall bank leverage ratio in Brazil, 2000-2013 
Data source: Bankscope (2014) 
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 The leverage ratio in Brazil in the year 2000 showed an increasing trend, at the same time the 
capital and liquidity ratios in Figures 4.2 and 4.6, were falling. The fall in capital and liquidity 
during the series of banking crises in Brazil in the late 1990s and early 2000 meant that the 
banking system was neither sound nor as efficient as it should have been during such a time of 
financial stress. One would expect that the levels of loans and provisions to the public or 
exposure in general would fall during this time, but this was not the case in Brazil in 2000. 
According to BCB (2000: 62), the loans that the public were allowed access to grew by 129%. 
This therefore exceeded the value of assets held by banks. In the case of defaults, the banking 
system would be left bankrupt and would face possible collapse. This explains the sharp rise in 
the leverage ratio in 2000-2001 as exposure in the banking sector was high.  
The leverage ratio fell in 2001, however for the wrong reasons. The Brazilian economy, as 
mentioned in Section 4.3.2, suffered the effects of a currency crisis which brought economic 
activity to a negative slump. As a result of this there was a recorded fall in the confidence of the 
public as well as the financial sector. This meant that as much as the banking system had enough 
capital (see Figure 4.2) and high valued assets (there was an asset growth of 5.9% in 2001), the 
leverage ratio would either remain the same or fall if this growth was not used to grant loans and 
advances. By the end of 2001, there was a sharp fall in the demand for goods and services and 
investment fell meaning that the banking sector suffered profit wise but were not at risk as the 
fall in aggregate demand meant that there was also a drop in the demand for loans and advances 
(BCB, 2001: 66; BCB, 2002: 29).  These can therefore be attributed to the fall in the leverage 
ratio from 2001-2002 as shown in Figure 4.10 above.  
The period from 2003-2006 exhibited a strong economy, which brought in more investment and 
more demand for credit from the public and companies. For banks, this was a huge boost and 
was the perfect environment to flourish and make high profits. In 2003 alone, the growth of 
credit operations was 8.3% while in 2005 growth in loans and advances was 21.5% (BCB, 2003; 
BCB, 2005). As mentioned in Sections 4.2.2 and 4.3.2, the increase in economic activity from 
2003-2006 increased the risk tolerance in the financial sector and therefore the trade in high risk 
securities also increased. This, together with the loans and advances exposure, meant that 
exposure in the banking system increased exceptionally. This explains the sharp rise in the 
leverage ratio from 2003-2006 as shown in Figure 4.10. The graph also shows that the leverage 
ratio reached its peak in 2006, with a sharp increase from 2005. This was caused by the fact that 
as exposure (loans and advances and risky trading) increased, capital fell sharply as shown in 
Figure 4.2.  
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 However, the increasing trend of the leverage ratio stopped at the end of 2006 as the growth in 
loans and advances slightly fell while capital and asset values increased as the BCB took a tighter 
approach to regulation. In 2007, general loans and advances to the public recorded a 0.2% drop 
as compared to the previous year, while Figure 4.2 shows a sharp increase in the capital adequacy 
ratio which shows that the banking system was not only sound but had reduced exposure. By 
2007, the beginning of the financial crisis, banking exposure was rising again. Despite the small 
drop in loans and advances, there was a fall in the capital adequacy ratio (which meant a fall in 
asset values as well), as shown in Figure 4.2. This was during a time when there was an increase 
in the trading of global risk securities which generally increased exposure in the banking system 
(BCB, 2008). This increasing trend, as shown in Figure 4.10, continued all the way through the 
financial crisis (2009).  
As Brazil announced its early intentions of implementing the BASEL III Accord, preparations 
for implementing the ratios also started early. This is despite the fact that the actual 
implementation phase only started later than expected (see Chapter 3). Early preparations meant 
an increase in capital starting in 2010. It also meant better regulation of the trading of global 
risky securities that had increased exposure in the years before. It also meant new rules for banks 
with regard to the granting of loans and advances (BCB, 2011). All these amendments helped to 
bring capital and liquidity ratios up as well as bringing down exposure, as shown in Figure 4.10. 
The Brazilian banks therefore seem on track to achieving the BASEL III set targets.  
4.4.3 China 
The leverage ratio in the Chinese banking system from 2000-2013 is shown in Figure 4.10 below. 
 
Figure 4.11: Overall bank leverage ratio in China, 2000-2013 
Data source: Bankscope (2014) 
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 The leverage ratio trend shown in Figure 4.11 indicates that the Chinese banking system has had 
relatively low exposure during the sample period. The ratio fell from 2000 to 2003 then from 
2003-2004, the graph displays a flat trend which shows the lack of data for this period. The ratio 
started going up significantly until 2006. The exposure was briefly lowered for a year from 2006-
2007 but it started rising again to 2008. The leverage ratio then fell for a short period from 2008-
2009 after which it spiked again all the way to 2013.  
As mentioned in Section 4.3.3, the Chinese banking system took long not only for it to develop 
but to open up to the global community as well. This makes analysis of the trends before 2002 
challenging to explain. Just as was done in Section 4.4.2, there is going to be regular reference to 
the trends in Sections 4.2.3 and 4.3.3 especially for periods prior to 2004. This is because prior to 
2004, the banks’ balance sheet and business trends in China were mainly under the direct control 
of the government and reports were not required to be published at this time. Therefore 
movements of the leverage ratio will only be analysed according to how the government 
regulated the components that make up the leverage ratio, as mentioned in Section 4.4.  
With the Chinese government controlling the banks’ and the financial institutions’ activities, the 
importance of risk management and soundness in the financial sector were made the top priority. 
The Chinese banking sector was not always well capitalised, but still safe from the effects of 
globalisation as well as financial stress. As mentioned in Section 4.2.3, as part of the Chinese 
reform, there were phases of capital injection by the government performed in the banking 
sector. Therefore the Chinese banks would not only maintain high valued assets but as a result of 
these capital injections, they would also have the cover they needed in the case of financial stress. 
At this point in time, the only loans and advances that the Chinese banks were allowed to grant 
were to the business sector and had to be approved by the government. This meant that the level 
of exposure in the banking sector was not even remotely high as even trading of securities was 
under the microscope (Schmidt, 2009).  
As part of the Chinese reform, the government also went through phases of cancelling non-
performing loans for the SOCBs (see Section 4.3.3). On top ofcreating liquidity pressures on 
banks, non-performing loans can also raise the level of exposure for the banks. Therefore this 
move not only raised liquidity in the 2000-2004 period but also lowered the leverage ratio 
considerably (Bihong, 2006). The falling trend of the leverage ratio can be clearly seen in Figure 
4.11 above.  
As soon as the government realised that banks in China would help fast track the economy if 
they were given the freedom to grant loans and advances as well as trade more extensively in 
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 international securities, everything changed. As part of its reforms, the Chinese government put 
bank regulation in the hands of the CBRC and as well as prepared the banking sector for the 
introduction of international banks. Relaxed capital requirements, more risky trading freedom 
and relaxed loan granting laws therefore raised the leverage ratio from 2005-2006 as shown in 
Figure 4.11. By the end of 2005, foreign banks were allowed to operate in the Chinese market. 
(Bihong, 2006; Dang et.al, 2014).  
However, as mentioned in Section 4.3.3, the rise in the levels of “shadow banking” as well as the 
introduction of foreign banks into the Chinese market initiated the need for tighter regulatory 
controls on banks. Therefore the CBRC not only raised capital requirements for all banks, but 
made them tougher for the foreign banks and those domestic banks that would trade globally. 
This helped to raise the capital adequacy ratio as well as the liquidity ratio and it also helped in 
reducing the level of banks’ exposure, so there was drop in the leverage ratio from 2006-2007 as 
shown in Figure 4.11 (Bihong, 2006). 
This was short-lived though as 2007 marked the beginning of the financial crisis. The rising 
leverage ratio form 2007-2008 shows that the Chinese banking sector reacted positively to the 
trading of global risky securities and that they participated in the housing bubble. It also 
indicated a rise in exposure within the banking sector. The CBRC therefore reacted by raising the 
capital levels so as to lower the levels of exposure for banks which worked; as Figure 4.11 shows 
that from 2008-2009, the leverage ratio did fall (CBRC, 2008).  
China started implementation of the BASEL III Accord in 2013 but had begun preparations well 
before that (see Chapter 3). The CBRC required banks to follow the minimum 3% level that the 
BASEL Committee suggested. The leverage ratio in China has been rising, as shown in Figure 
4.11 and banks are well in the right course to meet the BASEL targets by 2018.  
4.4.4 Leverage ratio comparison 
Figure 4.12 below shows the compared trends of the leverage ratios. The comparison of the 
leverage ratios is different from the comparisons done for the capital and the liquidity ratios. 
This is because, as mentioned before, it has been optional, before the introduction of BASEL 
III, for banks to use the leverage ratio as a tool for checking their levels of exposure. Therefore 
there has not been enough data and reports to show how bank leverage ratios in each country 
have been and why they have the trends that they have.  
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Figure 4.12: Overall bank leverage ratios, South Africa, Brazil and China, 2000-2013 
Data source: Bankscope (2014) 
Note: * Start of BASEL II implementation preparations and Chinese capital liberalisation 
        ** Financial crisis 
        *** Start of BASEL III implementation preparations 
The graph shows that South Africa and Brazil have generally had higher ratios during the sample 
period, as compared to China. As mentioned before, the South African and Brazilian financial 
and banking sectors have been more evolved and globalised as compared to the Chinese 
financial and banking sectors. The Chinese only reached this level of openness, that the other 
two countries had been on for decades, in 2005 when they began preparing to let foreign banks 
in. This explains the difference in the levels of exposure between China and its two counterparts.  
Despite the general high ratio for South Africa, its ratio as well as China’s, fell by the beginning 
of the year 2000 while Brazil’s increased. As mentioned in Sections 4.2.4 and 4.3.4, Brazil has had 
the highest trends with regard to capital and liquidity ratios as compared to South Africa and 
China. This is clearly the case as well for the leverage ratio as shown in Figure 4.12. The healthy 
economic conditions Brazil has been enjoying over the past decades also brought about a wave 
of risk within its banking and the financial sectors, as compared to South Africa and China. 
Prior to 2004, China and South Africa’s leverage ratios fell while the ratio in Brazil increased, but 
however all three countries had high or increasing leverage ratios from 2004-2006. The Chinese 
banking sector had been well reserved and highly state controlled to the extent that banks did 
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 not have a high overall leverage ratio as compared to the banks in South Africa and Brazil. In 
2005 however, Figure 4.12 shows how all this changed as the leverage ratio in the China began to 
rise and correspond with the levels in South Africa and Brazil. Therefore, Chinese capital 
liberalisation and the rise in global shadow banking contributed to these increases in the leverage 
ratios for the three countries. This supports the fact in the literature that the rise in shadow 
banking and the trading in risky securities might have helped in the build up to the 2008 financial 
crisis. Brazil and China’s leverage ratios fell from 2006-2007 while the ratio in South Africa was 
high but fairly stable. South Africa and Brazil had stable ratios from 2007-2008 but China 
exhibited an increase in the leverage ratio during this period. 
As the countries entered the 2008 financial crisis, it is visible that with the slight exception of 
South Africa, leverage ratios in Brazil and China increased in response to the rise in shadow 
banking as well as the housing bubble which had increased the level of mortgages as well as non-
performing loans. While it did not take long for Brazil and China to react to the crisis, South 
Africa’s leverage ratio only started going up as the crisis intensified, which is 2008-2009, as 
shown in Figure 4.12 above. After 2008, Brazil’s and China’s leverage ratios fell, while South 
Africa’s kept rising and as Figure 4.12 shows, the leverage ratio in South Africa rose from 2008-
2012 and then it started coming down slowly to meet the ratios of Brazil and China. This might 
have meant the banks in South Africa were performing better than those in BrazilandChina 
The graphalso shows that the leverage ratio in South Africa has not dropped since then while the 
ratio in China has not dropped since 2009. However, Brazil seems to have low leverage ratio 
compared to South Africa and China since 2009. The ratio in Brazil only started improving 2012 
showing it is also, like the other two countries, on the track to achieve BASEL set targets. The 
latest levels of the leverage ratios in Figure 4.12 show that the three countries have been 
complying with the BASEL III guidelines. They therefore appear very comfortable and on the 
right track in terms of the BASEL Committee’s proposals for the ratio, as the trends are stable 
and steadily rising.  
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 CHAPTER 5 
MAJOR FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study was to study the developments in the regulation of the financial 
markets, with banks in particular, in South Africa, Brazil and China over the period of 2000-
2013. This arose as a result of the recent implementation of the BASEL III Accord by many 
countries around the world. A secondary goal of this research was to establish the existence of 
regulatory alignment among these three countries, which is an important aspect of the study as 
the countries that were being compared are not only trading partners but are all members of the 
BRICS countries (the other two countries being Russia and India). For the purposes of the 
length of the study, it was not possible to include Russia and India.  
Another secondary goal was to establish the financial soundness of the banking systems of the 
three countries by analysing the capital adequacy ratios, leverage ratios and liquidity ratios.  
5.2 MAJOR FINDINGS 
The 2008 global financial crisis surely opened the eyes of the financial regulators as tighter and 
tougher regulatory rules have been implemented globally since 2009. All three countries under 
this study have not been behind in this transition of bank regulatory laws as they have also been 
involved in implementing internationally recognised regulations. South Africa, Brazil and China 
are among the many developed and developing countries that have chosen to follow the BASEL 
regulations and they have implemented all three Accords. Implementation of the new Accord, 
BASEL III, only started in all three countries in 2013.  
Preparations for the implementation of BASEL III were slightly different from country to 
country. While South Africa chose to follow the general timeline that the BASEL Committee 
had proposed, China and Brazil chose to announce early implementation. This meant that their 
preparations would be rigorous and tougher than those that were done in South Africa. China 
and Brazil introduced measures to make sure that banks had more capital cover as compared to 
South Africa. However, despite the fact that China and Brazil announced early implementations, 
their preparation timelines were shorter than that of South Africa, as shown in Table 3.3. South 
Africa also went the extra mile to propose other programmes that could help in implementing 
the new Accord. This is with reference to the twin peaks approach that was discussed in Chapter 
3.  
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 However, as mentioned earlier, the different preparatory and implementation procedures among 
the three countries do not mean that there is no regulatory alignment. There were bound to be 
differences in the ways each country chose to prepare for the implementation and the ways each 
would eventually implement the Accord. This is because the procedures that the BASEL 
Committee proposed for the implementation of BASEL III were simply suggestions, meaning 
that each country had the right to deviate from these procedures and use methods that would fit 
their system the best. It was also discovered that all three countries started their implementation 
procedures by analysing their financial and banking systems to try and find the right methods to 
use.  
South Africa and China started implementing the new Accord early 2013 while Brazil ended up 
delaying implementation despite having announced early implementation intentions. This meant 
that banks in Brazil had to be subjected to tougher capital levels as compared to their 
counterparts in South Africa and China. While all countries have shown much progress in 
implementing BASEL III, assessment reports done by the RCAP suggested that there were still 
some major areas that needed special attention so that the Accord could be effective.  
Therefore, in analysing the developments of bank regulation globally, it was established that 
there have been major developments in making the banks sounder and safer. However, it is 
unfortunate that what has made this development possible are the lessons from the effects of 
financial crises and the collapse of many banks. Bank regulation in the developing world has 
become tighter ever since it became apparent that the effects of globalisation were not all 
positive. This is mainly the case with China, a country that has had its financial system separated 
from the global community for many decades only to open up in the late 21st century. While it 
has been unfortunate that many banks have collapsed over the years, the lessons have been 
helpful in making the global banking community more resilient.  
In analysing the ratios that were proposed as part of the BASEL III package, it can be seen that 
while capital adequacy ratios have always been present in BASEL I and BASEL II, the 
introduction of the liquidity and the leverage ratios can be more than helpful in reducing the 
degree of risk in the banking sector. It has become apparent that while a bank can be well 
capitalised, poor management and high-risk trading can lead to the accumulation of risk within 
the banking sector and this can prove to be detrimental. Therefore, the two supplementary ratios 
are helpful in reminding banks about their levels of risk. The leverage and the liquidity ratios can 
also be helpful in devising proper risk management tools for the banks. Despite the 
controversies that have surrounded the leverage ratio especially, it was established that with the 
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 proper implementation procedures and proper management, banks could benefit more from the 
ratio. 
Times of financial stress have been well associated with negative ratio trends. In analysing the 
capital adequacy ratios for South Africa, Brazil and China, it was discovered that the aspects of 
financial and banking crises, poor economic performance, currency crises and even globalisation, 
to mention but a few, have been well associated with low capital adequacy levels for banks. It 
was also established that in most cases, banks would go on to collapse as a result. This shows 
that capital adequacy ratios are important and if maintained they would prevent the collapse of 
many banks. This is so because good economic times and proper regulation by the governments 
or regulators as shown in parts of Chapter 4 are associated with high capital adequacy ratios and 
sound banking systems. The importance of capital adequacy ratios was also established as it was 
shown that the three countries would occasionally inject capital into the banking system so as to 
strengthen the banks.  
Liquidity ratios were also seen to be very important for the sound and effectiveness of the 
banking system as the Chapter 4 analysis showed that the more liquid banks were, the more safe 
they were from the effects financial crises. Like capital adequacy ratios, liquidity ratios were seen 
to be associated with times of poor economic performance and financial crises. Regulators and 
governments showed how serious they are when it comes to the liquid assets that banks hold as 
well as their overall liquidity. This is because lack of liquidity has been one of the major reasons 
why banks have since failed to pull themselves out of financial and banking crises. However, it 
does not really mean that the low liquidity is always good for a bank as it may suggest that the 
bank is under-utilising its assets and resources. 
Leverage ratios on the other hand are different from the liquidity and the capital adequacy ratios 
as high leverage ratios have not been associated with good times but rather times of financial 
stress. It was established that very high leverage ratios were in part responsible for the 2008 
financial crisis. While high leverage for a bank or an institution may mean profits, it also means 
that the level of exposure for the bank will be very high. Therefore, as Chapter 4 shows, the high 
leverage ratio trends have been associated with times of banks’ demise. This has led governments 
(especially China) to go ahead and cancel the exposures for banks that would probably raise the 
leverage ratio, e.g. non-performing loans. Leverage ratios are complicated and governments are 
still to actually announce how they will reach their targets. 
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 5.3 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the study of the implementation of BASEL III in South Africa, Brazil and China, it can 
be concluded that with the proper implementation procedures and effective management the 
new Accord can achieve a sound global banking environment. The three countries have also 
shown that they are willing to put in high investments for the proper implementation of the new 
Accord; therefore when it comes to proper management all countries seem to be doing well. 
Regulatory powers in South Africa have been given to the SARB, in Brazil they have been given 
to the BCB, and in China regulation for banks is the responsibility of the CBRC. This kind of 
specific delegation in regulation could prove to very effective since these regulatory institutions 
are well funded and have one job to focus on.  
The existence of regulatory alignment has been established for South Africa, Brazil and China. 
This is because all three countries have since used mostly the same bank regulations as per the 
requirements of the BASEL Committee. They also meet the international standards for banks 
regulations and use most of the same regulatory institutions. This was important, as mentioned 
earlier, as these three countries are major trading partners and this would limit the possibilities of 
bank arbitrage for banks that have branches in these three countries.  
It can be concluded that the three ratios that were proposed by the BASEL Committee under 
the BASEL III Accord are important for banks and therefore can be used to prevent the re-
occurrence of financial crises in the future. If these ratios had been enforced before the 2008 
financial crisis, it can be safely assumed that they would have shown banks the right way to limit 
the levels of risk they were subjecting themselves to. They would have also been useful in 
preventing the collapse of many banks that failed as a result of the 2008 financial crisis. It should 
however be noted that the ratios are only effective if implemented under the right management 
and the timelines are followed. While regulation of banks in South Africa, Brazil and China has 
since proven to be effective and resilient thus far, more still needs to be done as global risk still 
exists. Regulation of risky global securities has to be tighter, the ratios have to be constantly 
enforced and credit advances have to be kept in check as well.  
5.4 AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
There has not been an adequate study of the implementation of the capital adequacy ratios, 
leverage ratios and liquidity ratios prior to this one. Prior studies would have been of help in 
making better comparison analyses of the ratios. For this study, reliance for the analysis was 
placed on the data and reports, published by the central banks for the three countries, on the 
ratios. However, these reports and data on the ratios have been limited, making the study 
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 difficult. Therefore it would be suggested that more research be done on the trends of the ratios 
as well as the reasons for the trends so as to supplement this current study. It would also be 
suggested that central banks and the banks themselves publish more reports on the ratios so they 
can be better understood.  
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